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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the thirty-seven years since its publication, Garrett Hardin’s 
Tragedy of the Commons1 has clearly become one of the most 
influential writings of all time.  The tragedy of the commons is one 
of those rare scholarly ideas that has had an enormous impact in 
academia2 and is also commonly used outside of academia.3  In legal 
scholarship, the tragedy of the commons has been used to 
characterize a scarcity of intellectual property rights,4 
telemarketing,5 over-litigation of asbestos actions,6 neglect of 
Presidential papers,7 overcrowding of the radio spectrum,8 
overcrowding of the wireless telecommunications spectrum,9 
sidewalk vending,10 greenhouse gas emissions,11 water pollution,12 
 
1 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
2 A Westlaw search on November 22, 2004 yielded 919 hits for “‘The Tragedy of the 
Commons,’ /s Hardin.”  A search of the social sciences citation index on the same day 
produced 2,890 hits.  Among the hundreds of books treating the concept in depth are: ELINOR 
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION (1990); CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, 
THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE 
FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); COMMONS WITHOUT TRAGEDY: 
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM OVERPOPULATION—A NEW APPROACH (Robert V. 
Andelson ed., 1991). 
3 A Google search on January 17, 2005 for “tragedy of the commons” yielded over 468,000 
matches.  Furthermore, a January 17, 2005 Westlaw search of the U.S. Congressional 
Testimony database yielded 32 hits, while a search of the Congressional Record database 
turned up ten hits, including an article by Scott Hodge entitled How Congress Forces Uncle 
Sam to Waste Money (submitted by Rep. Tom DeLay (R-Tex.)) which argues that political 
pork-barreling is a political tragedy of the commons.  136 CONG. REC. 16,175 (1990).  Another 
hit was Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) stating that overuse of “fuel which enjoys hidden 
subsidies and external costs” is a tragedy of the commons.  137 CONG. REC. 11,278–79 (1991). 
4 See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129, 141–42 (2004) (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely 
Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 475 (2003)). 
5 See Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 87 (2003). 
6 See Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 
1721–22 (2002). 
7 See Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government: The Convergence of 
Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of Presidential 
Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651, 715–17 (2003). 
8 See Karl M. Manheim & Lawrence B. Solum, An Economic Analysis of Domain Name 
Policy, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 416 (2003). 
9 See Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless 
Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863, 935–37 (2004). 
10 See Gregg W. Kettles, Regulating Vending in the Sidewalk Commons, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 
1, 3–4 (2004). 
11 See Roberta Mann, Waiting to Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1135, 1144 (2002); Laura Kosloff & Mark Trexler, State Climate Change Initiatives: 
Think Locally, Act Globally, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 46, 46 (2004). 
12 See Richard J. Lazarus, Celebrating Tahoe-Sierra, 33 ENVTL. L. 1, 4–5 (2003). 
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overdrafting of underground water,13 and of course, the classic 
environmental commons problem, overfishing.14 
Remarkably, of the thousands of putative applications of the 
tragedy of the commons, not one has sought to formally define the 
term.  In fact, this overabundance of citations highlights the fact 
that although we invoke it often, we do not know exactly what 
constitutes a tragedy of the commons.  Hardin himself was most 
concerned with “exorciz[ing] the spirit of Adam Smith,”15 thus 
focusing his attack on the perils of unconstrained freedom.16  
Extensive treatments of the tragedy of the commons have 
emphasized other key aspects of the tragedy, such as resource 
scarcity,17 free-rider problems,18 and lack of property rights.19  
However, after nearly four decades of scholarly examination, no 
established formal definition has emerged. 
Defining a tragedy of the commons is not simply an academic 
exercise.  As I define it in this Article, a tragedy of the commons 
involves resource users overexploiting a resource and imposing 
mutual externalities upon each other.  In true tragedies of the 
commons, Pareto Superior20 policy moves are possible in ways that 
are generally not feasible in other large-group externality problems, 
in which this self-destructiveness is absent.  Saving the resource 
users from themselves and their mutually-imposed harms provides 
a paternalistic justification for intervention.  This irony is what 
really animated Hardin’s famous lament and is the most direct 
 
13 See David J. Hayes, Privatization and Control of U.S. Water Supplies, 18 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T. 19, 23 (2003). 
14 See Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust as an Obstacle to 
Marine Resource Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 9–10 (2004). 
15 Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244. 
16 Hardin’s article is replete with signs of his disdain for the notion that more freedom is 
always better.  His subheadings include “Tragedy of Freedom in a Commons,” id.; “How To 
Legislate Temperance?,” id. at 1245; “Freedom To Breed Is Intolerable,” id. at 1246; “Mutual 
Coercion Mutually Agreed upon,” id. at 1247; and “Recognition of Necessity,” based upon 
Hardin’s quote from Hegel: “Freedom is the recognition of necessity,” id. at 1248.  Hardin also 
criticized maritime nations for “respond[ing] automatically to the shibboleth of the ‘freedom of 
the seas,’” id. at 1245, and Western cattlemen for “constantly pressuring federal authorities to 
increase . . . [grazing limits] to the point where overgrazing produces erosion and weed-
dominance.”  Id. 
17 LESSIG, supra note 2, at 22. 
18 OSTROM, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
19 DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 6 (2002) (“It is the sociolegal fact of open access—the inability 
of any user or group of users to enforce their management decisions against any other user or 
group of users—that obstructs conservation of the resource.”). 
20 See generally ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 312–16 (1995). 
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attack on Adam Smith’s libertarian manifesto.21 
Of course, in overexploiting a resource, resource users may also 
impose externalities upon a larger group that has some stake in the 
resource, such as the general public might have in clean air or 
water.  This large-group externality alone may be sufficient 
justification for intervening, but a true tragedy of the commons 
specifically involves a situation in which the resource users are 
detracting from their own ability to continue to exploit the resource.  
Saving the resource users from themselves provides, independent of 
the need to internalize other large-group externalities, a 
particularly compelling case for governmental intervention. 
I use the definition set forth in this Article to analyze a problem 
that has not been previously recognized as a tragedy of the 
commons—the problem of ever-increasing political campaign 
expenditures.  In Part II of this Article, I set out my definition of a 
tragedy of the commons using the overfishing problem and other 
examples to illustrate what is unique about this class of problems.  
In so doing, I distinguish it from the broader set of large-group 
externality problems that are mischaracterized as tragedies of the 
commons problems, such as air and water pollution.  In Part III, I 
use the overfishing problem to illustrate the dynamics of tragedies 
of the commons, showing how resource degradation over time 
impacts resource users.  In Part IV, I apply this analysis to the 
problem of political campaign spending, showing how the problem is 
similar to the problem of overfishing, and showing how the current 
campaign spending debate, framed as freedom versus equality, is 
misguided.  In Part V, I address the question of why those trapped 
in a tragedy of the commons are not more eager to address their 
joint overexploitation problem.  Finally, in Part VI, I discuss 
solutions to tragedies of the commons, in particular those for the 
campaign spending problem. 
II. THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS 
A. Hardin’s True Tragedy 
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons has proven to be a worthy foil to 
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.”22  Hardin’s story of resource 
 
21 See infra Part II.A. 
22 Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244; George J. Stigler, Introduction to ADAM SMITH, 
SELECTIONS FROM THE WEALTH OF NATIONS vii–ix (George J. Stigler ed., AHM Publ’g Corp. 
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overexploitation poses a striking contrast to Smith’s narrative 
illustrating the coincidence of self-interest and collective interest.  
Whereas Smith’s lesson is that individuals acting in their self-
interest will act to increase collective wealth,23 Hardin’s lesson is 
that individuals acting in their own self-interest will ruin collective 
wealth.24  Consciously or not, all varieties of public policy are 
debated in ways that draw heavily upon at least one of these two 
concepts.  Indeed, these two competing ideas, each based upon 
antithetical conceptions of the ability of people to order their own 
affairs, often serve as the underlying bases of arguments for and 
against governmental intervention.  The “invisible hand” and the 
tragedy of the commons serve, in this policy realm, as the 
ideological beacons of libertarians and interventionists, those with 
opposing viewpoints of the appropriate role of government. 
Whereas the implication of Smith’s narrative is quite clear—
government should intervene as little as possible—the implications 
of Hardin’s tragedy are not.  A variety of different policy 
prescriptions can cure the “commons” problem.25  In his article, 
Hardin called for “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon.”26  But 
what does this mean?  In the stylized examples provided by Hardin, 
a variety of interventions might be appropriate.  To address the 
problem of pollution, some form of governmental pollution control 
 
1957).  Stigler characterizes Smith’s concept as an “identity of interest” between self- and 
collective interests.  Id. at vii. 
23 See Stigler, supra note 22, at viii.  Smith’s treatment of the division of labor, in which 
self-interested individuals agree to divide productive tasks to increase overall production, 
serves as one example of how self-interest can help produce increases in collective wealth.  
See ADAM SMITH, SELECTIONS FROM THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 10–13 (George J. Stigler ed., 
AHM Publ’g Corp. 1957). 
24 Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244.  Hardin details numerous examples of what he considers 
a tragedy of the commons, but most telling is his ultimate rationale for intervention: “mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed upon.”  Id. at 1247. 
25 Scholars have long noted that Hardin’s “commons” problem is more powerfully applied in 
an “open access” setting, where no ownership rights exist at all, as distinguished from a 
common-pool resource.  See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: 
Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 93, 106 
(2003) (finding that common-pool resources can limit overuse whereas “open access” resources 
are subject to overexploitation).  The difference between a “commons” and “open access” is 
that a “commons” involves a resource that is jointly owned by a group of individuals who can 
exclude those outside the group, while “open access” is one in which there is no ownership or 
exclusion at all.  Id.; COLE, supra note 19, at 15–16.  A common-pool resource is thus one that 
can be considered as open access on the “inside” (within the group of joint owners) but private 
property on the “outside” (outside the group of joint owners).  Rose, supra, at 106; Carol M. 
Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and 
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 144 (1998). 
26 Hardin, supra note 1, at 1247. 
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regulation may be called for.27  To address the overgrazing problem 
described in detail by Hardin, some limits to grazing are called for.28  
But Hardin’s message was not consistently interventionist.  To 
address the overpopulation problem,29 Hardin seemed to prescribe 
the termination of some social programs that he considered to be 
subsidies for having more children.30  To address the overcrowding 
of national parks, Hardin suggested that privatization might be 
called for.31  Hardin’s message was that something needed to be 
done, but he did not seem to distinguish between a governmental 
solution and a privatization solution, or the range of options in 
between.32 
I suggest that Hardin’s greatest contribution, the core insight of 
his article, is the identification of a class of problems in which there 
is a need to protect resource users from themselves, and to protect 
their own long-term access to the resource by limiting short-term 
access.  This is the key to what scholars find most anomalous about 
the tragedy of the commons: the markedly illiberal notion that 
protecting resource users requires constraining their liberty in some 
way.  This is how the tragedy of the commons can serve as the 
counter to the invisible hand—by representing the interventionist 
position.  In Hardin’s world, intervention is necessary because, 
despite the long-term futility of embarking upon the tragic course of 
overexploitation, people persist in doing so.33  If a tragic player 
 
27 See id. at 1245 (stating that taxes and laws which “make it cheaper for the polluter to 
treat his pollutants than to discharge them untreated” may be a means of addressing the 
tragedy of the commons involved in water pollution). 
28 See id. at 1245 (suggesting that cattlemen’s failure to understand the concept of a 
tragedy of the commons leads them to pressure authorities to continually raise grazing limits 
to the point that erosion and weed dominance occur). 
29 See id. at 1243 (explaining that as population grows exponentially, the resources of a 
finite world are stretched thinner). 
30 Id. at 1246. 
If each human family were dependent only on its own resources; if the children of 
improvident parents starved to death; if, thus, overbreeding brought its own 
“punishment” to the germ line—then there would be no public interest in controlling the 
breeding of families.  But our society is deeply committed to the welfare state, and hence 
is confronted with another aspect of the tragedy of the commons. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
31 Id. at 1245. 
32 Hardin’s critics include those who maintain that often no intervention is necessary at 
all.  For example, Coasians might argue that there is no principled basis upon which to 
intervene, since “injurers” or “victims” are mistaken constructs.  R. H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960).  Others, such as Ellickson, note that even in the face of 
transaction costs, people are often quite capable of ordering their own affairs by developing de 
facto property regimes independent of any governmental intervention.  Robert C. Ellickson, 
Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1386–87 (1993). 
33 Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244. 
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could take a long-term view of resource exploitation or find a way to 
cooperate with fellow resource users—hardly heroic things to 
expect—the tragedy could be avoided.34  Yet for a variety of reasons, 
tragedies persist,35 particularly in environmental settings. 
This formulation of the tragedy of the commons can be 
distinguished from the broader class of large-group externality 
problems in which resource users impose externalities upon a larger 
population, without necessarily harming themselves in the process.  
This historical confusion exists because in both types of problems 
the overexploitation pertains to jointly-owned or unowned 
resources.36  These ill-defined property regimes serve as the root 
cause of overexploitation.  But Hardin’s prescription of “mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed upon”37 seems oriented toward solving 
problems within the resource user group and not necessarily (but 
often) on alleviating externalities imposed upon those outside of the 
user group.  Furthermore, Hardin’s examples of the tragedy of the 
commons—overpopulation, overcrowding of national parks, even 
bank-robbing—are most useful for illustrating the human 
propensity not simply to spoil something for everybody, but to spoil 
something for themselves. 
What then is a “true” tragedy of the commons?  I suggest that a 
truly tragic resource overexploitation, or a true tragedy of the 
commons, contains all of the following elements: 
 (1) Mutual, uninternalized externalities.  A tragedy of the 
commons involves, if not perfectly symmetrical situations among 
identical players, at least a mutuality of externalities.  The 
mutuality of externality places parties in mirroring situations in 
which every player knows that attempts at cooperative behavior 
will be met with cheating, and that every player knows that every 
player knows this.  Knowing that even if one refrains from cheating 
others will cheat creates irresistible incentives to cheat. 
 
34 See generally OSTROM, supra note 2, at 88–102 (examining the conditions under which 
cooperative arrangements, formal and informal, can solve common-pool resource problems). 
35 There are two broad classes of reasons why tragedies persist even in the presence of 
enormous incentives to cooperate: (i) transaction costs and (ii) behavioral anomalies.  The 
literature on transaction costs as a barrier to cooperative behavior is voluminous and well-
established, beginning with Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. 
ECON. REV. 347, 354–55 (1967) and OSTROM, supra note 2, at 190–91.  A review of the more 
recent literature on behavioral anomalies that confound solutions to the tragedies of the 
commons can be found in Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to 
Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241 (2000). 
36 More broadly, the overexploitation exists because of an improper property definition.  
COLE, supra note 19, at 4. 
37 Hardin, supra note 1, at 1247. 
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 (2) Group payoffs that are less in uncooperative outcomes than 
they are in cooperative ones.  The tragedy of the commons must be 
distinguished from distributive questions.  If uncooperative 
behavior merely leads to a wealth transfer without any loss of 
overall welfare, then there is not necessarily any efficiency loss 
suffered from the societal point of view.38  A “tragedy” implies a loss. 
(3) A resource that is rivalrous in consumption.  While situations 
involving nonrival goods may also produce incentives for 
uncooperative behavior, rivalrous consumption among those in a 
competitive environment creates particularly strong incentives to 
cheat.  The understanding that consumption by others detracts from 
one’s own consumption, coupled with the mutuality of externalities 
and the knowledge that this will likely lead to cheating by others, is 
what gives rise to the inevitability of uncooperative behavior. 
A game-theoretic illustration may be helpful to demonstrate the 
logic of tragic behavior, and an economic explanation of why the 
tragedy can be so persistent.  Consider a game involving two 
fishermen, A and B, that will last for 100 time periods, with A 
moving in periods 1,3,5, . . . 99, and B moving in periods 2,4,6, . . . 
100.  The fishery is assumed to have a capacity to sustainably yield 
100 fish caught per period.  That is, if A and B catch more than 100 
fish in any period, the stock will be depleted and the capacity will 
fall to 99 for the following period and for all periods thereafter.  
Thus, if A and B could reach an agreement and honor it, they could 
sustainably harvest 100 fish per period for the entire 100 periods.  
As a baseline, assume that A and B would evenly split the 100 fish 
each period, and harvest 50 each.  In any period, A or B could 
“cheat” and fish harder to catch an extra fish, or could “abstain” and 
maintain a current level and effort of fishing.  It is further assumed 
that the effort from fishing is of negligible cost to these fishermen.  
That is, the gain of catching extra fish is of paramount 
consideration. 
If, in time period one, T1, A abstains from cheating and in time 
period two, T2, B decides to cheat, B will gain an extra fish for T2.  A 
will have harvested 50 fish and B 51 fish, yielding 101 fish in T2, but 
reducing the harvest capacity to 99 for T3 and all periods thereafter.  
Assuming B maintains the higher fishing effort for the remainder of 
the game, it is reasonable to assume that in future time periods, A 
and B will divide the 99 fish by harvesting 49 and 50, respectively.  
 
38 See Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 921 (2004). 
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A B
T1: abstain { 0, 0 }
T2: abstain
A
T2: cheat
{ -98, +1 }
T3: abstain
The net result for the entire game would thus be that B will have 
gained one fish, and A, by losing out on one fish for each of the rest 
of the 98 periods, will have lost 98 fish, net of her baseline of 50 fish 
per period.  If A does not retaliate by cheating but rather abstains, 
the game can be represented by Figure 1 and the payoffs by Table 1. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
Payoffs {A,B} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 It is reasonable to assume, however, that A would retaliate.  In 
fact, it would be perfectly rational for A to do so.  If A chose, in T3, to 
retaliate by fishing harder as well, she would also net an extra 
fish—50 instead of 49, and by both of them catching a total of 100 
fish in T3, in an environment in which the yield capacity is 99, A 
would play her part in reducing the capacity in T4 and subsequent 
time periods to 98.  In T4 and subsequent time periods, assuming 
that A and B fish equally hard, and assuming B abstains from 
further cheating, it is reasonable to assume that they would split 
the catch at 49 fish apiece.  This game is shown in Figure 2 and the 
payoffs in Table 2. 
 
T A B 
1 50 50 
2 50 51 
3-100 49 50 
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A B { 0, 0 }
A { -98, +1 }
B { -97, -96 }
T1: abstain T2: abstain
T2: cheat
T3: abstain
T4: abstain
T3: cheat
FIGURE 2 
Payoffs {A, B} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this outcome, A’s payoff would be less by one fish for the 
remaining 97 periods, resulting in a net payoff of -97, relative to her 
baseline of 50 fish per period.  B’s payoff would also reflect this 
reduced payoff, but B benefited by cheating early on and catching 
an extra fish in T1.  B’s net payoff is thus -96, relative to her 
baseline, one more than A’s.  Although A has embarked upon the 
path to mutually tragic overexploitation, A is better off cheating as 
compared to the “abstain” strategy.  Because of B’s cheating, A was 
going to settle for 49 fish per year.  By catching an extra fish in T3, 
A at least obtained an extra fish in T3, making her payoff less 
negative, -97 instead of -98.  This can be seen by examining the last 
two branches of the game tree in Figure 2 (A’s payoff is the first 
number in brackets).  If B chooses to abstain from further cheating, 
T A B 
1 50 50 
2 50 51 
3 50 50 
4-100 49 49 
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B will, despite her elevated effort, also catch one less fish for the 
remaining 96 periods.  This is the penalty absorbed by A and B for 
fishing too hard and reducing the fishery’s carrying capacity. 
The game is likely to descend further, however.  At T4, B may not 
abstain and may well decide that she is not ready to settle for 
harvesting only 49 fish per year.  The same calculus applies in T4 as 
in T2: B can gain an extra fish by fishing a little harder, still 
catching 50 fish in T4.  Even though the yield capacity will be 
further reduced to 97 (by virtue of A and B catching a total of 99 fish 
in an environment in which the capacity is 98), B will nevertheless 
realize a temporary, one-period gain of one fish.  For the remainder 
of the game, B will be fishing harder still just to catch 49 fish per 
period, but under the assumption that fishing effort is costless, B 
will be better off for her single extra fish for one time period only.  
Because B is fishing harder than A, it is reasonable to assume that 
A and B will split the catch at 48 and 49 fish, respectively.  B will 
thus have a game-total net of -95 (a loss of one fish for the 
remainder of the 95 periods plus the extra fish caught in T2), a 
better outcome than the final outcome in Figure 2, in which her net 
was -96.  A, in the meantime, will suffer a loss of two fish every 
period for periods 5 through 100, and a loss of one fish in T4, for a 
game-total of -193 below her original cooperative baseline of 50 per 
period. 
What next?  At T5, A will retaliate by fishing still harder as well.  
Of course, A realizes that this is ultimately a fool’s errand, but A 
realizes that she can at least snare an extra fish for one year by 
fishing harder.  The yield capacity will be reduced to 96, which will 
be split by A and B at 48 fish apiece, given their equally hard 
fishing efforts (assuming B abstains from further cheating).  But A 
was going to settle for 48 fish per year, so she reasons that she 
might as well get the extra fish this year, and by snaring an extra 
fish in T5, A at least improves from -193 to -192.  The outcome is 
shown in Figure 3, and the resulting payoffs in Table 3. 
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A B { 0, 0 }
A { -98, +1 }
B { -97, -96 }
A { -193, -95 }
B { -192, -190 }
T 1: abstain T 2: abstain
T 2: cheat
T 3: abstain
T 3: cheat
T 4: abstain
T 4: cheat
T 5: abstain
T 5: cheat
T 6: 
abstain
FIGURE 3 
Payoffs {A,B} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   TABLE 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Several interesting things about Figure 3 are worth noting.  First, 
it is an extensive-form representation39 of the tragedy of the 
commons, as opposed to the traditional one-period normal-form 
 
39 See, e.g., MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 20, at 221–28 (1995); ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME 
THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 115–16 (1992). 
T A B 
1 50 50 
2 50 51 
3 50 50 
4 49 50 
5 49 49 
6-100 48 48 
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representation.40  Second, while the miniscule private gains are 
swamped by the huge social losses, from an individual’s point of 
view, it remains rational to pursue the tragic path.  At each decision 
node, it pays to cheat rather than abstain.  The mutual externalities 
remain uninternalized.  Finally, A’s reward for abstaining in T1 was 
to suffer an inferior payoff to B in every time period.  Thus, there is 
not only a disincentive to abstain, but a compelling incentive to 
cheat, and cheat first.  The compelling incentive to cheat is not 
simply the miniscule gain of one fish in one time period, but the 
realization that abstention will be met with cheating.  Herein lies 
the inevitability of the tragedy: the incentives to cheat are 
irresistible.  They are irresistible because of the symmetrical nature 
of the externalities, and the mutual realizations that any abstention 
will be punished, and the realization that the other player 
understands that her abstention will be punished. 
The solution to the tragedy of the commons, as many have noted, 
is cooperation.41  In the above game, the gains from cooperation 
would swamp those of adopting a cheating strategy.  Professor 
Elinor Ostrom’s seminal work on cooperative arrangements 
identified a number of sustainably-harvested common-pool 
resources, sometimes managed and exploited by fairly large 
groups.42  However, cooperation takes place only if the resource 
users can overcome the transaction costs of cooperation, costs which 
can be daunting even in small groups and rise exponentially with 
the number of resource users.43 
Even a casual review of the world’s environmental problems 
reveals the difficulty of overcoming the transaction cost problem.  
The problem of constraining emissions of greenhouse gases that 
induce global climate changes has, over the thirteen years since 
formal recognition of the severity of the problem,44 made only 
 
40 GIBBONS, supra note 39, at 27–29, 126–27 (describing the tragedy of the commons as a 
mathematical sequence of single or first order decisions). 
41 See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 2, at 15–17 (using as an example a group of herders who 
make contracts among themselves and monitor each other to make the most efficient use of 
grazing land). 
42 OSTROM, supra note 2, at 61–65 (high mountain forest communities in Switzerland); id. 
at 65–69 (forest communities in Japan); id. at 69–82 (irrigation districts in Spain); id. at 82–
88 (irrigation districts in the Philippines). 
43 See id. at 60–61 (observing that if transaction costs for communal management were 
excessive, the community members may choose different management arrangements); id. at 
224 n.2 (noting the observation that negotiating costs for communal arrangements may be 
large and include the policing of the agreement). 
44 The signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change marked 
the beginning of formal international legal efforts to bring about an international regime for 
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halting progress towards even a modest step, the Kyoto Protocol,45 
which has been spurned by the largest emitter, the United States.46  
International gamesmanship has clearly foiled even this massive 
effort to solve perhaps the most pressing and serious of 
environmental problems. 
Similarly, the problem of rapid overdrafting of groundwater from 
the Ogallala Aquifer, the dominant source of water for the 
agricultural Midwestern United States, has been recognized for 
decades.47  As the largest aquifer in the world, the Ogallala could, if 
managed properly, sustain the American agricultural Midwest in 
near-perpetuity.48  What has been done about it?  While all the 
states using the aquifer have some form of groundwater 
overdrafting regulations,49 their effectiveness is severely curtailed 
by the fact that Texas, the largest extractor of the Ogallala 
Aquifer,50 still has the common law “rule of capture” governing 
groundwater withdrawals.51 
The abundance of other examples makes it clear that Ostrom’s 
work, which identified the conditions that must exist for cooperation 
to take hold and arrest the tragic behavior, only emphasizes the 
uniqueness of the situations in which the conditions are met, and 
the reality that failures remain the rule, successes the exception.52 
In addition to the transaction cost problem, a second class of 
obstacles to cooperation has been identified.  Explanations for 
pathologies that have hindered cooperation have emerged from the 
 
regulating greenhouse gas emissions that may result in global climate change.  United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, done May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849. 
45 See Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto 
Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22. 
46 Alan Cowell, Summit Leaders Still Differ and Protesters Still Protest, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 
2005, at A6. 
47 MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 
455 (1986) (“It is a dead certainty that the Ogallala will begin to give out relatively soon; the 
only question is when.”). 
48 See id. at 457 (concluding that the Ogallala Aquifer could have been “made to last 
hundreds of years instead of decades”). 
49 See id. at 455 (noting that “all . . . states regulate the pumping of groundwater”). 
50 Id. 
51 Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 75–80 (Tex. 1999) (holding 
that a landowner may withdraw as much water from beneath their land as desired without 
incurring liability from neighbors who may be injured by such a withdrawal).  But see id. at 
77–78 (noting that the legislature retained the power to regulate water use even within the 
framework of the rule of capture). 
52  OSTROM, supra note 2, at 88–102 (analyzing eight similarities among those common-
pool resources that have been managed and harvested sustainably despite the lack of 
property ownership). 
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behavioral psychology literature.  These pathologies include self-
serving perceptions of entitlement and fairness,53 myopia in 
interpreting uncertainty,54 reluctance to agree on burden-sharing,55 
and endowment effects that reinforce the status quo.56  A more 
detailed discussion of these pathologies is set forth in Part V. 
A true tragedy of the commons is thus the existence of a dynamic 
in which resource users overexploit a resource that is rivalrous in 
consumption so that they jointly reduce the long-term potential for 
exploitation.  The tragedy lies in the way that resource users 
contribute to their own ruin by engaging in selfish behavior. 
B. Do Nothing? 
There is the objection that the assumption in the illustrative 
game above, namely that fishing effort is negligible compared with 
the harvesting gains, is at a certain point, unrealistic.  As fishing 
effort increases, the cost of effort is likely to increase and the 
benefits likely to decrease, due to diminishing returns.  At some 
point, it becomes unprofitable to overexploit, or to exploit at all, 
thereby putting an end to the cycle of overexploitation.  Thus, the 
solution that suggests itself is to do nothing and allow the 
overexploitation to run its course, at which time the resource users 
will voluntarily cease.  Given the futility of many interventionist 
attempts to solve tragedies of the common in the past, this solution 
has merit in some circumstances.  However, the level of exploitation 
at which profitability disappears completely is apt to be at a level of 
harvesting that is sub-optimally high. 
To illustrate this last point, consider the example of a fishery, 
shown in Figure 4, in which the marginal benefits and average 
benefits of exploitation decrease as harvesting level increases.  We 
can assume constant marginal and average costs without loss of 
generality.  The optimal harvesting level is qo, the point at which 
marginal benefits equal marginal costs.  However, as long as there 
are no entry barriers—as there would be if there were private 
ownership of the fishery or some entry restrictions—capital will 
 
53 See Thompson, supra note 35, at 256, 260. 
54 See id. at 262 (detailing the tendency of humans to be short-sighted as to the 
consequences of actions, especially in the commons dilemma and when there is uncertainty). 
55 See id. at 260, 262. 
56 See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 39, 44 (1980) (defining the “endowment effect” as the propensity for people to hold onto 
what they already have). 

HSU (FINAL2).DOC 2/20/2006  7:06:24 PM 
2005] What Is a Tragedy of the Commons? 91 
give up on solving the tragedy of the commons and allow the 
situation to deteriorate to the point of rent dissipation.  Such a 
course would in effect be a determination that rent dissipation is a 
lesser evil than an inappropriate regulatory response.  At the point 
of rent dissipation, at least, the fish will get a break.  This may be a 
plausible approach for some tragedy of the commons problems.  For 
example, problems that truly are intractable, for which any 
regulatory response or property rights solution would be truly 
abhorrent or unworkable, this may be the answer.  Some fisheries 
which are particularly difficult to police fall under this category.60  
It could also be that the plundered resource is a resilient one such 
that any respite from overexploitation will allow it to quickly bounce 
back to healthy levels.61  It may also be that the capital used in 
exploiting a resource is a flexible one that exits the industry easily, 
avoiding the danger that the capital will get locked into the resource 
and irreparably overexploit it.62 
However, for many, if not most, tragedy of the commons problems, 
such a let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may approach is clearly 
inadequate.  The problem is that irreparable harm may have 
already occurred at the rent dissipation level.  In the fishing 
example, it is possible that rent dissipation may not occur until the 
fish stock has crashed to the point that it is driven to extinction or 
will never recover.  Obviously and most importantly, the economic 
harm to the resource users is usually not our only concern.  
Resource overexploitation usually imposes externalities upon the 
rest of the world.  In this way, the loss of a fish species will 
invariably upset ecological balances in ways that are impossible to 
 
60 Cf. Thompson, supra note 35, at 245 (noting the difficulty of enforcing agreed-upon 
regulation in complex commons dilemmas, such as world fisheries).  For example, Thompson 
notes that the human propensity to assign blame to others makes it difficult to get resource 
users to agree on anything.  See id. at 260–62.  New England fishermen blame the decline of 
blue fin tuna on Gulf of Mexico fishermen, who in turn blame it on Mediterranean fishermen, 
who in turn blame it on New Englanders.  Id. at 261. 
61 Paterson and Wilen showed that where the exploited resource is resilient—in other 
words, where it bounces back from depletion quickly—the danger of irreversible 
overexploitation is low.  See D.G. Paterson & J. Wilen, Depletion and Diplomacy: The North 
Pacific Seal Hunt, 1886–1910, 2 RES. ECON. HIST. 81, 121–25 (1977). 
62 Also, where capital exits and enters the fishery quickly and easily, there is less danger 
that capital will have to rely solely on the fishery for income.  Once the stock is depleted 
enough to render exploitation unprofitable, the fishermen will exit the fishery, concentrate on 
another, more profitable species, and return only when the stock is healthy enough to exploit 
profitably again.  See id. at 122 (finding that the responsiveness of capital to conditions such 
as profitability and opportunity costs affects when capital can be invested or reinvested into a 
harvest).  This is not to say that this exploitive pattern is ideal, only that the dangers of 
irreparable harm are less in some circumstances than others. 
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predict, and that are harmful to the entire world. 
C. Distinguished From Other Large-Group Externality Problems 
What I define in this Article as a “true” tragedy of the commons 
can be distinguished from other large-group externality problems 
involving jointly-owned or unowned resources.  There are two 
important differences: (1) a tragedy of the commons involves an 
externality imposed by resource users upon each other by damaging 
their own ability to exploit the resource, and (2) the exploited 
resource is rivalrous in consumption. 
A tragedy of the commons does not preclude, of course, the 
imposition of externalities on those outside the group.  Fish 
consumers, ichthyologists, conservationists, and those otherwise 
intrinsically interested in preserving fish stocks would suffer 
negative externalities at the hands of the tragic fishermen even as 
the latter destroy their own livelihood.  But as I define it, the 
existence of an externality imposed by resource users on those 
outside the group is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for a tragedy of the commons.  A tragedy of the commons can be self-
contained, with resource users destroying themselves without 
harming anyone outside of the group.  In addition, unless resource 
users are harming themselves by overexploitation, the imposition of 
an externality upon those outside the group does not, by my 
definition, make the situation a tragedy of the commons. 
Consider the example of air pollution.  Hardin himself thought 
this to be an example of a tragedy of the commons, only air pollution 
involves the excessive putting in of something—pollution—rather 
than the excessive taking out of a scarce resource.63  There is a 
similarity in the calculus facing the individual in that the polluter 
enjoys the full benefit of polluting by saving money on pollution 
controls,64 just as the herdsman enjoys the full benefit of grazing an 
additional animal by reaping the profits of another animal.65  In 
both cases the costs of this behavior are shared among many.66  
However, whereas there is a paternalistic justification for 
intervention in a tragedy of the commons, intervention in the more 
general case of air pollution may need to be justified on the grounds 
of internalizing externalities to others. 
 
63 Hardin, supra note 1, at 1245. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1244. 
66 Id. at 1244–45. 
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It is true that air polluters would benefit from pollution 
regulation in an indirect way as members of the air-breathing 
public.  Is the difference, then, between a tragedy of the commons 
and other large-group externality problems merely a matter of 
degree?  The answer is no because in a tragedy of the commons, 
regulation confers very different benefits upon the resource users 
than upon the larger group.  In the overfishing case, regulation that 
saves fish stocks confers upon the general public a continued and 
stable supply of fish, ecological integrity by preserving a possibly 
important part of the aquatic ecosystem, and perhaps the psychic 
value of knowing that we have not decimated yet another species 
out of carelessness.  Like the rest of the world, fishermen enjoy 
these benefits.  But what is additionally conferred upon the 
fishermen is a continued ability to fish and practice their livelihood.  
This is a benefit that is very different from those consumption and 
conservation benefits that are enjoyed by the diffuse public, and the 
existence of this additional benefit is what characterizes a tragedy 
of the commons. 
By contrast, regulation that reduces air pollution yields similar 
benefits to air polluters and air breathers alike.  There is no 
argument that limiting air pollution helps air polluters in any way 
in their polluting efforts, or preserves their ability to pollute in the 
future.  Thus, while all large-group externality problems will realize 
benefits from regulation that inure to the large group (typically the 
general public), in a tragedy of the commons resource users will 
receive the additional benefit of being saved from their own 
improvidence as well as the ability to carry on in the future with 
their resource exploitation. 
Intervention may be entirely warranted, perhaps even 
compelling, for a variety of large-group externality problems such as 
air and water pollution.67  But the nature of the justification for 
such large-group externality problems is apt to be different than it 
is for tragedies of the commons.  The justification for arresting other 
large-group externality problems may be varied and complicated, 
and may involve difficult ethical questions regarding tradeoffs 
between economic growth and ecological or human health.  A cost-
benefit analysis may or may not be appropriate for making such 
 
67 A cost benefit analysis of the Clean Air Act, for example, showed compliance costs of over 
$500 billion, but environmental benefits in excess of $22 trillion.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990, at ES-8 (1997), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/812exec2.pdf. 
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decisions.  But the case for arresting tragedies of the commons is 
apt to include one simple, and compelling additional justification: 
save the resource users from themselves.  A well-designed 
intervention can yield a Pareto Superior outcome or a near-Pareto 
Superior outcome.  This is also not to say that successful regulation 
is always possible or feasible; however the case for trying is 
stronger. 
The second distinguishing feature of a tragedy of the commons is 
that the resource being overexploited is rivalrous in consumption.68  
Rivalrous consumption is what gives urgency to the race to exploit, 
and creates compelling incentives to cheat.69  This incentive is 
illustrated by the game theory model of the tragedy above in which 
A’s abstinence, even temporary, resulted in her having an inferior 
payoff to B in every time period.70  This derives simply from the fact 
that there are a limited number of fish.  With a non-rival resource 
problem such as air pollution, the capacity to pollute is not hindered 
by the amount of pollution itself.  However harmful air pollution 
has been for public health, polluting has not bumped up against any 
absolute physical limits that would prevent polluters from 
continuing to pollute.  Polluters thus do not face the same 
compelling incentives to pollute.71  To be sure, there are competitive 
forces that compel polluters to pollute, but there is no race to spew 
out the pollution before someone else has the opportunity. 
D. Other Examples of Tragedies of the Commons 
The tragedy of the commons is usually considered a story about 
property and property rights.  For example, one prescription for 
fixing the tragedy is the establishment of private property rights so 
that there is no externality.72  Like property law itself, the tragedy 
of the commons has insinuated itself into a variety of problems not 
 
68 See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 22 (noting that without rivalry for a resource in the 
commons, that resource will not be consumed and subsequently made unavailable). 
69 See discussion supra Part II.A (addressing mutual, uninternalized externalities, one of 
the elements of a “true” tragedy of the commons). 
70 See supra Part II.A. 
71 Lessig argues that for nonrivalrous goods, there is no possibility of a “tragedy of the 
commons,” since nonrivalry means that availability for users does not diminish with 
increased consumption.  LESSIG, supra note 2, at 22.  Lessig is arguing for leaving in the 
commons some intellectual property because of the positive network effects of such 
knowledge.  Id. at 26, 85.  However, the point of the tragedy of the commons metaphor, as 
applied to pollution problems, is that there are negative externalities associated with 
pollution that do not diminish pollution opportunities but should nevertheless be curtailed. 
72 Hardin, supra note 1, at 1245. 
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involving real property, or any physical res.  Similarly, it is worth 
remembering the lessons that property problems teach us for 
purposes of solving a variety of public policy problems outside of the 
property realm. 
1. Traffic Congestion 
Among students who have taken my environmental law courses 
in both Canada and the U.S., the most consistently identifiable 
tragedy of the commons problem is that of traffic congestion.  Traffic 
congestion provides an excellent pedagogical device for teaching the 
tragedy of the commons.  Because all drivers face the same decision 
environment, the problem of traffic illustrates the role of mutuality 
in explaining the persistence of an externality.  Also, the traffic 
problem showcases the importance of transaction costs in 
frustrating non-coercive solutions, in that negotiations among 
commuters are impossible.  Finally, traffic congestion illustrates the 
effects of overutilization of a resource that is rivalrous in 
consumption: roads.  Like other tragedies of the commons, resource 
users inflict losses upon themselves as a group in terms of the 
ability to use the resource, by lengthening commute times and 
degrading the transportation resource. 
Externalities are also imposed upon non-users, the air-breathing 
public, in the form of pollution.  But this is a separate and distinct 
large-group externality that is not itself the tragedy of the 
commons.  The politically safest justification for intervention is to 
save commuting drivers and protect their commuting experiences.  
Significantly, the hue and cry for solving traffic problems comes 
more typically from frustrated drivers than from those who worry 
about the air pollution externality being imposed upon the general 
public.73 
The traditional engineering solution to traffic congestion has been 
 
73 See, e.g., Chip Jones, Thinking Outside the Boxcar Warner Funding Initiative Sparks 
New Hopes for Passenger Rail Service, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Dec. 27, 2004, at D-12 (noting 
that a rail expansion plan in Northern Virginia promised to bring relief to angry commuters 
“tired of getting stuck in car traffic”); Duane D. Stanford, Toll Lanes Urged to Ease Gridlock; 
Private Contractors’ Proposal Would Use Truck-Only Lanes, Express Buses on I-75, I-575, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 30, 2004, at 1A (“Frustrated commuters would be able to buy their 
way out of traffic jams or ride trainlike express buses if the newest proposal to attack long 
commutes on Interstates 75 and 575 through Cobb and Cherokee counties is enacted.”); 
Stephen Ginsberg, Va. To Build Beltway Toll Lanes; Private Funding is Key; Car Pools Would 
Be Exempt, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2004, at A01 (“Officials have embraced the concept as a way 
to give motorists relief from chronic tie-ups.”). 
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to expand roadway capacity.74  This is often a self-defeating strategy 
as expanding roadway capacity has the effect of reducing 
transportation costs so that new demands are created by new 
users—new residential development, for example—that springs up 
specifically because of the new roadway capacity.75  This is an 
example of the kind of solution that ignores the second-order effects, 
those effects that are easily seen once one appreciates the nature of 
the externality.  A fisheries economist would easily understand that 
even if it were physically possible to respond to overfishing by 
stocking the fishery with more fish, it would be an exercise in 
futility.  This would only attract more fishermen to come in and 
participate in the tragedy. 
More thoughtful approaches to traffic congestion have thus been 
oriented towards internalizing the congestion externality, and 
trying to alter the incentives to participate in the tragedy.  This has 
been attempted by trying to draw people out of the pool of resource 
users, by imposing a time-of-day-sensitive congestion tax76 and by 
subsidizing alternative transportation modes such as transit and 
bicycling.77  Further, incentives may be provided to induce people to 
at least make utilization of the roads more efficient, by encouraging 
carpooling through the creation of high-occupancy vehicle lanes.78  
While not exactly like the overfishing problem, traffic congestion 
creates the same dynamics.79 
2. Performance-enhancing Substances in Sports 
Seemingly continuous revelations about the use of performance-
enhancing drugs being used by professional athletes have exacted a 
toll on the image of the affected sports.  Last year, baseball star 
Barry Bonds demurred suspiciously to inquiries regarding his 
 
74 Robert H. Freilich & S. Mark White, Transportation Congestion and Growth 
Management: Comprehensive Approaches to Resolving America’s Major Quality of Life Crisis, 
24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 915, 926 (1991). 
75 See id.; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social 
Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1247 n.76 (2000). 
76 Strahilevitz, supra note 75, at 1243–44. 
77 Id. at 1244–45 & n.65; Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and 
Potential Pitfalls of Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 260 
(2000). 
78 Strahilevitz, supra note 75, at 1238–39. 
79 The traffic problem is somewhat different from the overfishing problem in that there are 
no “stock” effects in which excessive current consumption somehow harms the potential for 
future consumption.  But the rivalrous nature of the resource still creates compelling 
incentives to cheat.  Indeed, no serious attempt is ever made to induce people to not drive so 
as to make others’ commutes more expedient. 
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knowledge about substances his trainer provided him that are now 
thought to have been steroids.80  Bonds claims to have believed that 
he was receiving flaxseed oil from his trainer, who remains under 
federal indictment for his connection with an alleged trafficker of 
illegal performance-enhancing drugs.81  Bonds has hit 703 career 
home runs, and is within reach of Hank Aaron’s Major League 
record of 755 home runs, a feat that would normally be cause for 
celebration.82  But Bonds, never a popular star to begin with, has 
seen his image further tarnished by this scandal, and it seems likely 
that his remarkable accomplishments will be overshadowed by his 
suspected steroid use.83 
There are athletes that would not trade places with Bonds, 
knowing that the use of such substances could exact a health toll in 
the long run.  Anabolic steroids have been linked to a variety of 
health disorders, such as infertility, baldness, distorted genitalia, 
and a heightened danger of drug dependence.84  And yet, because of 
the exorbitant payoffs of baseball success, there are those that 
choose to make that tradeoff.85  The late baseball star Ken Caminiti, 
who in a 2002 interview became one of the first baseball players to 
admit to using steroids, remained unapologetic for using them.  Two 
years before his death by drug overdose, Caminiti told a Sports 
Illustrated reporter that he felt steroids had become a “widely 
accepted” and even “necessary” means of maintaining a competitive 
edge in baseball.86  Caminiti estimated that “at least half” of all 
Major League players use steroids.87  This estimate is consistent 
with the estimate of former outfielder Chad Curtis, who played with 
 
80 Dave Anderson, Sports of The Times; Bonds’s Excuse Has the Scent Of Snake Oil, Not 
Arthritis Balm, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at D1; Dave Anderson, 2004: Steroids; Bonds and 
Giambi Testify And Change the Playing Field, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2004, at 87 [hereinafter 
Anderson, Steroids]. 
81 Anderson, Steroids, supra note 80, at 87. 
82 Donna Liquori, At a Shrine to Baseball, Steroid Inquiry Inspires Shame, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 5, 2004, at 146. 
83 Art Thiel, Baseball Immortality Bruised by Injuries, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 
10, 2005, at D1 (“The Giants’ star has 703 home runs, but the steroids scandal has baseball in 
a magnum twist about how to salute the pending surrender of its most hallowed individual 
record by a guy who looks more and more like a sports crook.”). 
84 Mayo Clinic, Performance-enhancing drugs: Dangerous, damaging and potentially 
deadly, http://www.mayoclinic.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). 
85 In effectively admitting steroid use, Bonds joins other baseball sluggers such as the late 
Ken Caminiti, Gary Sheffield, Jason Giambi, and Jose Canseco.  Dave Anderson, Sports of 
The Times; Is Anybody Listening to Caminiti’s Steroids Alarm?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at 
D4; Anderson, Steroids, supra note 80; Filip Bondy, Book of Lies? No Way, Jose! Canseco’s 
charges have juice, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Feb. 14, 2005, at 52. 
86 Tom Verducci, Totally Juiced, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 3, 2002, at 34, 36. 
87 Id. 
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six teams in ten major league seasons.88  Major League Baseball 
physicians estimated that ten to fifteen percent of all minor league 
players they examined tested positive for steroids.89 
Baseball success is an extremely lucrative resource that is 
perfectly rivalrous in consumption.  Winning necessarily precludes 
winning by others.  Achieving and maintaining a competitive edge, 
even a small one, can be the difference between success and failure. 
The incentive to cheat by using steroids and other performance-
enhancing substances is intense.  In the same Sports Illustrated 
interview, Caminiti offered this perspective on the use of steroids: 
If a young player were to ask me what to do . . . I’m not going 
to tell him it’s bad.  Look at all the money in the game: You 
have a chance to set your family up, to get your daughter 
into a better school. . . . So I can’t say, ‘Don’t do it,’ not when 
the guy next to you is as big as a house and he’s going to take 
your job and make the money.90 
While Caminiti evinces no regrets for using steroids, he clearly 
recognizes that steroids are a necessary evil due to the competitive 
pressures of baseball.  Putting aside the loss to those players that 
can successfully cheat and could not succeed at baseball without 
cheating, it seems clear that the vast majority of players would be 
better off with an effective and enforceable ban on the use of 
performance-enhancing drugs.  Ballplayers would then face a 
baseball career not competing with cheaters that use performance-
enhancing drugs, not being pressured to cheat, and if already 
cheating, not being pressured to cheat more, and cheat in more 
expensive and even more unhealthful ways.  It is thus the players—
the resource users—that truly do need to be saved from themselves. 
Appeals by civil libertarians would ring somewhat hollow in this 
context. 
The use of performance-enhancing drugs is not limited to 
American baseball players.  The mysterious deaths of eight young, 
apparently healthy, professional cyclists in a seventeen-month 
period spanning 2003 and 2004 would be shocking if there had not 
already been strong suspicions that the sport is still plagued by the 
misuse of dangerous performance-enhancing drugs and by 
dangerous blood-doping practices.91  Even 1998 Tour de France 
 
88 Id. at 37, 48. 
89 Id. at 42. 
90 Id. at 36. 
91 Ron Kroichick, Sports and Drugs Cycle of Tragedy; Baseball has BALCO, But Europe Is 
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champion Marco Pantani, who died mysteriously in 2004 from a 
drug overdose, had been ejected from a race in 1999 for blood doping 
and had continually battled allegations of blood doping and drug use 
since then.92  It is incredible that cyclists persist in taking such high 
risks to succeed, particularly one of Pantani’s stature.  But given 
the highly rivalrous nature of winning cycling races, the incentive to 
cheat is apparently irresistible.  Clearly, cyclists would benefit from 
an enforceable and effective ban since they would no longer find it 
necessary to cheat and risk their lives to succeed.  The apparent 
impossibility of enforcing such a ban, however, does not portend 
well for the sport. 
3. Informational Privacy 
Professor Dennis Hirsch has likened the loss of informational 
privacy to a tragedy of the commons.93  The overuse of personal 
information that leads to unwelcome solicitations and possibly 
nefarious uses of that information has increased dramatically, and 
has caused some to withdraw from electronic commerce.  Under the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, firms may share personal 
information collected from customers with other firms under a fairly 
broad “joint marketing” exception.94  The exception allows the 
sharing of information with unrelated firms if done “pursuant to 
joint agreements between two or more financial institutions.”95  
Given the ease of sharing highly useful information about buying 
preferences in an electronic format that is easy to process, the short-
term benefits to firms of sharing information are huge.  Even if just 
a small fraction of the information turns out to be useful in 
generating additional sales, the benefit will easily outweigh the low 
costs of this release of information.  Professor Peter Swire, who has 
praised most of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, is critical of this broad 
exception, which is most likely to be inconsistent with consumer 
expectations of what can be done with personal information 
 
Plagued With Its Own Sports Drug Scandal: EPO and Bicycling, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 9, 
2004, at C1. 
92 Id.; Obituaries, Marco Pantani, 34; Italian Cyclist Plagued by Doping Allegations, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, at B19. 
93 See generally Dennis D. Hirsch, Is Privacy Regulation the Environmental Law of the 
Information Age?, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY 
CONVERSATION (Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., forthcoming 2006). 
94 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2) (2000). 
95 Id. 
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provided in the course of a commercial transaction.96  Although 
evidence of consumer reluctance to engage in electronic commerce 
appears at this point to be inconclusive,97 there clearly remains the 
danger that this overuse of information will lead to consumer 
trepidation that could chill information-generating commercial 
transactions.98 
The tragedy of the commons can be seen more clearly in the 
invasion of our e-mail inboxes with spam.  Spam is trivially cheap to 
send, making it an economical practice if only as few as one in 
100,000 spam recipients becomes a customer.99  The sending of 
spam has taken off, rising from eight percent of all e-mail messages 
in 2001 to approximately fifty percent of all e-mail, totaling two 
trillion messages sent in 2003.100  While some services have 
developed spam filters, spam remains a fairly obnoxious disamenity 
associated with using what has become an indispensable electronic 
utility.  A recent study found that e-mail users spend an average of 
three minutes per day deleting spam, which multiplies out to 22.9 
million hours per week, and a staggering $21.58 billion per year 
based on an average wage.101  The tragedy of this commons, 
however, is not even the waste of our time but the loss of 
opportunity to use e-mail for marketing purposes, as legitimate 
marketers struggle to distinguish themselves from those selling 
cheap drugs and penis enlargers through spam.102 
III. THE OVERFISHING PROBLEM 
Despite the many applications of Hardin’s tragedy of the 
 
96 Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86 MINN. L. 
REV. 1263, 1296 (2002). 
97 See Robert E. Litan, Law and Policy in the Age of the Internet, 50 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1058 
n.46 (2001) (referencing a Harris survey which found that 92% of respondents were 
“concerned” and 67% were “very concerned” that their personal information was being 
misused). 
98 Concern over recent thefts of personal information at data clearinghouses such as Choice 
Point and LexisNexis have led to activity in the U.S. Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs Committee.  Tom Zeller, Jr., Consumer Data Stolen From LexisNexis, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Mar. 11, 2005, at 13.  The activity by the congressional committee is a sign that 
consumer anxiety about control of personal information remains high. 
99 AOL, Microsoft Seek Federal Help on Spam, MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL, Feb. 23, 2003, at 
D4. 
100 S. REP. NO. 108-102, at 2–3 (2003), as reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2349. 
101 Thomas Claburn, Spam Costs Plenty, INFO. WEEK, Feb. 7, 2005, at 15. 
102 See Chris Gaither, Clearing Way for Legitimate E-Mail? Marketers Hope Antispam Law 
Restores Industry’s Reputation, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 2003, at C1 (stating that “the sharp 
rise in the amount of spam . . . has made computer users quick to delete anything they 
perceive as unwanted—or to report it to their Internet service providers as spam”). 
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commons, open access fisheries have somehow borne out Hardin’s 
predictions the most faithfully.  Virtually every overfished fishery in 
the world has followed the same pattern of overexploitation over 
time.  First, a previously unexploited open access fishery is 
“discovered,” or somehow becomes the target of fishing, and the 
initial abundance of fish creates easy fishing conditions that provide 
large profits for the first entrants into the fishery.  Second, this 
prospect of large profits attracts new boats that crowd the fishery.  
Lastly, the increase in fishermen results in a depleted fish stock, 
making fishing more and more difficult, until the fish stock 
completely collapses, in the meantime impoverishing the fishermen.  
Examples abound, but a particularly striking example of this 
dynamic is provided by the late nineteenth-century and early 
twentieth-century Pacific halibut fishery, exploited primarily by 
U.S. and Canadian boats.103  Because of the availability of data 
going back to the late nineteenth century, the Pacific halibut fishery 
provides an excellent opportunity to examine the economic and 
ecological dynamics of fishing, the interaction of fishermen with fish 
over time, and the sometimes symbiotic relationship between the 
two. 
The Pacific halibut fishery was essentially unregulated until 
1924,104 when the United States and Canada created by treaty the 
International Fisheries Commission, a body charged with studying 
the halibut fishery and making recommendations on halibut fishery 
management.105  The 1924 treaty also created a fishing season, 
limiting halibut fishing to nine months of the year.106  The lack of 
regulatory limitations on halibut fishing during the nine-month 
season negated any beneficial effect produced by the three month 
closing.107  Binding limitations took effect in 1931, however, after 
the United States and Canada signed a new treaty which 
 
103 A narrative description of the development of the Pacific halibut fishery highly similar 
to that provided above can be found in Int’l Fisheries Comm’n [IFC], Regulation and 
Investigation of the Pacific Halibut Fishery in 1947, IFC Rep. No. 13, at 7–8, 16 (1948), 
available at http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scirep/Report0013.pdf. 
104 By “unregulated,” I mean to say that there were no quantitative limitations on fishing.  
American and Canadian halibut markets remained relatively open to imports, and neither 
government was particularly inclined to exclude fishing boats from their neighboring country.  
Thus, although there were still regulatory requirements, they did not impose any limits on 
fishing.  See generally id. at 7. 
105 Id. at 7–8. 
106 Id. at 8. 
107 William F. Thompson & F. Heward Bell, IFC, Biological Statistics of the Pacific Halibut 
Fishery, IFC Rep. No. 8, at 11 (1934), available at http://www.iphc.washington.edu/ 
halcom/pubs/scirep/Report0008.pdf. 
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implemented aggregate catch limits for several intensively-fished 
areas.108  The new convention produced an immediate reduction in 
the amount of fishing effort and a concomitant increase in fishing 
efficiency.109 
The early twentieth-century history of the Pacific halibut fishery 
illustrates: (i) the incentive for individual fishermen to overfish, 
resulting in a collective overfishing; (ii) a general increase in effort 
in fishing; and (iii) a markedly consistent decrease in fishing 
efficiency, measured by quantity of catch per quantity of fishing 
effort.  Table 4 shows recorded pacific halibut landings on the 
Pacific Coast of Southeastern Alaska, Canada, and Washington 
State for the years 1910 to 1933.110  The second column shows the 
total pounds of halibut landed for the year.  The third column shows 
the total number of utilized “skates.”111  The fourth column provides 
a measure of fishing efficiency by listing a “catch-per-unit-effort” 
known as the catch per skate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 Id. at 11, 13. 
109 Id. at 13–14.  Thompson and Bell concluded that the “rise in catch per unit . . . is due in 
1932 and 1933 to regulation, which has deliberately held the total catch at a level after an 
initial decline in the amount of fishing, and despite the resultant rise in catch per unit.”  Id. 
at 23. 
110 Pacific halibut were divided into two distinct stocks, one that stayed generally south of 
Cape Spencer, and one that generally stayed west of Cape Spencer.  Id. at 19.  Statistics 
concerning halibut landings for the individual stocks are very similar to each other in the 
years 1923 through 1933.  Id. at 12. 
111 A “skate” is a ground fishing line that has a fairly standardized number of hooks per 
unit of length.  Id. at 21. 
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TABLE 4112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Several interesting trends should be noted in Table 4.  First, there 
was a general trend of increases in the number of skates each year, 
a measure of the amount of fishing effort expended each year.  This 
consistent twenty-one year trend must be considered some evidence 
of the inexorability of the tragedy.  Second, with the exception of 
just three years before 1930, there was usually a decrease in fishing 
 
112 Id. at 12. 
 
Year 
 
Pounds landed
Number of 
Skates 
Catch per 
Skate (lbs) 
1910 51,849,240 191,325 271.0 
1911 56,931,796 240,219 237.0 
1912 60,379,550 343,066 176.0 
1913 56,235,578 436,273 128.9 
1914 45,276,669 364,840 124.1 
1915 45,025,016 381,568 118.0 
1916 30,218,908 263,690 114.6 
1917 31,602,797 386,342 81.8 
1918 27,070,659 309,379 87.5 
1919 27,402,631 332,960 82.3 
1920 33,158,192 394,271 84.1 
1921 37,476,466 487,340 76.9 
1922 31,294,067 499,915 62.6 
1923 28,844,269 504,270 57.2 
1924 27,004,148 483,945 55.8 
1925 23,941,311 462,187 51.8 
1926 25,790,876 494,078 52.2 
1927 24,630,270 498,588 49.4 
1928 27,209,093 569,228 47.8 
1929 26,253,998 653,085 40.2 
1930 22,598,895 643,843 35.1 
1931 22,473,326 548,130 41.0 
1932 22,881,718 456,721 50.1 
1933 23,599,734 452,970 52.1 
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efficiency each year.  The dramatic decline in efficiency from 271 to 
35 over just twenty-one years is evidence of the severity of the 
mutual externality halibut fishermen imposed upon each other, as 
well as evidence of the decline of the halibut stock.  Third, there was 
a general downward trend in the total amount of halibut landed, 
which represents additional evidence that the health of the halibut 
stock continuously declined through this period. 
In short, the data in Table 4 does a remarkable job telling the 
story of the tragedy of the commons.  An abundant halibut fishery, 
first exploited in 1888, is a profitable one in 1910.  The profitability 
causes more boats to enter, as reflected by the increase in skates.  
Over the next twenty-one years, boats entered and exited the 
halibut fishery, but there was no question that the fishing became 
more difficult, as reflected by the steady decrease in fishing 
efficiency.  The decrease in fishing efficiency is also a sign of a 
declining halibut stock.  Fortunately, this story has, at least by the 
1930s, a relatively happy ending—intervention in the form of a 
treaty takes place that limits the amount of halibut fishing.  
Profitability, as reflected by fishing efficiency, starts upward again. 
The lessons of the early twentieth-century halibut fishery are 
two-fold.  Clearly, regulation was needed to save the resource and 
preserve it for the entire world.  But regulation was also needed to 
save the fishermen from themselves.  As fishing efficiency spiraled 
steadily downward, fishermen were caught in the trap of having to 
fish just to salvage what they could from a depleted stock.  Failure 
to fish, giving up on the race to fish, meant having their only 
valuable capital asset—their boat—sit idle.  With many fishermen 
still paying off loans on their boats, idleness was not an option. 
The poverty trap that has engulfed many fishing communities is 
in fact what has motivated economists to study the open access 
fishing problem.  As early as 1955, H. Scott Gordon derived the 
mechanism by which fishing communities invariably fished 
themselves into a bust cycle in which they discovered an abundant 
fish species, rushed in with too many boats, and wound up 
overfishing the stock to the brink of a collapse, with the fish stocks 
utterly unable to provide fishing communities with sufficient income 
to fend off poverty.113 
 
113 Gordon’s theoretical findings that fishing will continue to a point beyond the optimal 
and beneficial level find support from studies of the halibut case.  See William F. Thompson & 
Norman L. Freeman, IFC, History of the Pacific Halibut Fishery, IFC Rep. No. 5, at 10 (1930), 
available at http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scirep/Report0005.pdf (“The great 
effect of inconspicuous mechanical changes and of cheaper power explains on the one hand 
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Regulation was thus needed not only to save the Pacific halibut, 
but to save the halibut fishing industry.114  This latter aspect is the 
one conveniently overlooked by categorical opponents of regulation, 
those unqualified libertarians for whom the answer to everything is 
deregulation or privatization.  There is often the implicit 
assumption that any form of regulation is a subtraction from an 
individual right, and that it invariably diminishes the wealth or 
utility of the regulated individual.115  This assumption overlooks the 
gains to be had from cooperation, and gains that can be created by 
institutions, governmental or otherwise, that facilitate and even 
mandate cooperation. 
IV. THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROBLEM 
A. Overfishing for Votes 
Ubiquitous campaign advertisements in all kinds of media seem 
to have accomplished two things: numbing the voting electorate to 
campaign advertisements, and cultivating a concern over the role of 
money in political campaigns, particularly federal ones.116  The 
pervasive nature of campaign advertising has dulled voters’ senses 
to the messages behind the advertising.  One study reported that 
registered voters saw an average of almost eight campaign ads on 
TV per day during the week leading up to the 2002 congressional 
 
the present existence of the fishery despite a greatly lowered abundance, and on the other 
indicates . . . that the decline will be continued far beyond the limit which seems at present 
profitable.” (emphasis added)). 
114 For one of many accounts of how the failure to regulate resulted in the wreckage of the 
Atlantic cod fishery, see generally MICHAEL HARRIS, LAMENT FOR AN OCEAN: THE COLLAPSE 
OF THE ATLANTIC COD FISHERY, A TRUE CRIME STORY 66–67 (1998) (discussing how 
improvements in technology coupled with the lack of regulation and poorly enforced 
regulation lead to the demise of the Atlantic cod fishery). 
115 The Reagan Administration disapproved a plan which would have more strictly 
regulated the beleaguered halibut fishery because it “ran counter to the free market.”  John 
Balzar, A Catch as Catch Can Fish Plan, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1992, at A1.  As aides 
explained, “As an Administration, we’re just opposed to limiting fishing to only those who 
have formerly fished. . . . We are concerned that it would interfere with basic economic 
liberties.”  Id. 
116 See, e.g., Carl Hulse & Anne E. Kornblut, McCain Allies Seek Reform and the Money to 
Get It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at A18.  Additionally, states have not been spared from the 
cycle of campaign spending for state-wide elections.  The number of political action 
committees [PACs] in Virginia to address state elections has nearly doubled in the last four 
years, reflecting the ballooning costs of seeking statewide elective office.  R.H. Melton, 
Campaign Costs Soar, Prompting Va. Power PACs; Groups Serve Specific Interests, Helping 
Donors Direct Dollars, WASH. POST, June 2, 2003, at B01. 
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campaign.117  Ballooning campaign expenditures and the increasing 
amount of time and effort politicians spend fundraising have fueled 
a suspicion that money has gained more than just a toehold over 
political institutions and processes.118  Former Congressman Lee 
Hamilton, as director of the Center on Congress at Indiana 
University, has lamented this voter cynicism: 
The rising flood of money that flows into campaigns also 
undermines general public trust in the political system. 
Many Americans feel it is money, not ideas and not 
principles, that reigns supreme in our political system. I 
often heard people say that the political process was run by 
the moneyed interests, so they saw little reason to vote.119 
This widespread suspicion only exacerbates the anesthetizing 
properties of campaign speech.  A perception that a political 
candidate has been bought and paid for only dulls the viewer to the 
substantive aspects (if any) of campaign speech.  A report by the 
Pew Center for the People and the Press found that while the 2000 
presidential campaign was generally better in terms of information 
available, candidates’ commercials were considered less effective 
than they were in 1992.120  One might not be surprised that pundits 
are loudly crying foul in response to the increased use of private 
funds in political campaigns,121 but not even critics of campaign 
finance reform proposals believe that the system we have for 
running political campaigns is particularly good.122 
Debates about the efficacy of and problems with campaign speech, 
 
117 DAVID B. MAGLEBY & J. QUIN MONSON, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF ELECTIONS AND 
DEMOCRACY, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV., CAMPAIGN 2002: “THE PERFECT STORM” 7, 18 (2002). 
118 LEE HAMILTON, THE CTR. ON CONG. AT IND. UNIV., THE MONEY CHASE, 
http://congress.indiana.edu/radio_commentaries/the_money_chase.php (last visited on Oct. 3, 
2005). 
119 Id. 
120 PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, CAMPAIGN 2000 HIGHLY RATED 2 
(2000), available at http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?ReportID=23. 
121 See, e.g., David S. Broder, Level the Presidential Playing Field, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 
2003, at B07; E.J. Dionne, Jr., How to Fix Financing, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2003, at A41; 
Thomas B. Edsall & Dan Balz, Kerry to Forgo Public Campaign Financing; Democrat Says He 
Will Use Own Money, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2003, at A12; Editorial, Your Turn; Fix the 
Finance Rules for Presidential Races; The Public-Financing Program for Presidential 
Candidates, Designed to Even the Playing Field, is Broken, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
Nov. 12, 2003, at 6B. 
122 BRADLEY SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, at x 
(2001) (“Few people like our current campaign finance laws.  I certainly don’t, and in that 
respect I am a full-throated ‘reformer.’”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance 
Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 326–29 (1998) (suggesting possible solutions to campaign 
finance problems). 
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however, are rarely followed by satisfying discussions of solutions. 
The greatest obstacle to solving the campaign spending problem is 
that almost any conceivable solution would somehow impinge upon 
Constitutionally-protected speech.  Furthermore, inherent in the 
debate is the notion that Constitutionally-protected speech is good, 
and more speech is better.  Even campaign finance reform advocates 
seem willing to concede to the notion put forth in the dissent by 
Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States,123 in which Holmes 
argued for a “free trade in ideas” and “that the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market.”124  This led to the popularization of the phrase 
“marketplace of ideas,” coined by Justice Brennan125 to describe the 
notion that the best way to ascertain the truth is to have 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” discussion126 serve as an open 
competition of ideas.  The freer the discussion, the more robust the 
competition and the more certain the truth, goes the reasoning. 
The battle over campaign finance reform has been waged with 
this truism in mind.  The campaign finance problem is seen as a 
clash of the principles of equality and freedom of speech, with free 
campaign spending being equated with free speech.127  Some reform 
advocates have argued that equality principles have become 
jeopardized, and that regulation is warranted in order to correct the 
heavy bias towards those interest groups that tend to be well-
funded.128  Inherent in their position is a Rawlsian notion that 
uncontrolled campaign spending disadvantages the less wealthy 
 
123 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
124 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
125 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
126 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
127 MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF 
DEMOCRACY 136–39 (2001); SMITH, supra note 122, at 10–11 (2001); see, e.g., Spencer A. 
Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property Characteristics of Political Money, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1253–56 (2000). 
128 See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Toward A Democracy-Centered Reading of the First 
Amendment, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1055, 1055–57 (1999) (refuting the Court’s assertion in 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), that corruption is the only justification for campaign 
finance reform and arguing that political equality should be acknowledged as a “‘compelling’ 
justification” for limits on spending); Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign 
Finance After the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1213 
(2002) (commenting that campaign finance regulations do nothing to combat large individual 
and PAC contributions to incumbents, leading to their overwhelming economic advantage); 
Yoav Dotan, Campaign Finance Reform and the Social Inequality Paradox, 37 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 955, 998–99 (2004) (arguing that judicial intervention is justified in a system of 
market inequalities where the elite may use their “economic leverage” to distort the 
democratic process). 
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and violates equality principles.129  Detractors of campaign finance 
reform, on the other hand, argue that given the necessarily clumsy 
and ultimately flawed ways of regulating campaign finance, it is 
better to stick with the principle that is easier to defend—freedom of 
speech, and relative freedom to contribute to campaigns.130  I do not 
weigh in on this equality versus freedom debate, except to say it is 
the wrong debate. 
Some reform advocates take their cue from Judge Skelly Wright131 
and from Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in Nixon v. Shrink 
Missouri Government PAC,132 and take issue with the notion that 
campaign money is purely “speech.”  The argument of this camp of 
reformers has been that campaign contributions implicate property 
interests, not speech interests.133  This view would presumably 
bifurcate the spending of money and the use of that money to 
purchase speech, as acts of separate legal import.  For purposes of 
this Article, I put aside this objection to consider the impacts of the 
spending and the speech taken together.  I do not weigh in on this 
“property vs. speech” debate.  Although this Article will briefly 
discuss the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, I do not weigh 
in on the important question of what can and should be done to 
regulate non-candidate or third-party expenditures and 
contributions.  This Article only speaks to speech, and its effects on 
speech itself. 
Neither reform advocates nor detractors have examined the 
underlying premise of the free speech argument: that more speech 
 
129 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 360 (1993) (observing that wealthier 
candidates under the present system are more able to unfairly manipulate the electoral 
process to their advantage); see also Colin Feasby, Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) and the 
Administration of the Process of Democracy under the Charter: The Emerging Egalitarian 
Model, 44 MCGILL L.J. 5, 9–11 (1999) (stating that the largest hurdle to achieving equality in 
political participation is personal affluence). 
130 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 122, at 194, 198–200; Sullivan, supra note 122, at 311–13; 
Eugene Volokh, Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Basically Right, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1095, 1095–97 
(2002). 
131 J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 
1005–06 (1976). 
132 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Money is property; it is not 
speech.”). 
133 REDISH, supra note 127, at 122–25; see, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: 
A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1222 (1994); Jamin 
Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of 
Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1164–66 (1994); Spencer 
Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 73, 84–85 (2004) (illuminating the idea that excessive wealth used to “gain political 
advantage or access” poses a far greater threat to democratic political participation than 
speech). 
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is always better.  “Better” in what sense?  From the speaker’s 
viewpoint, more speech is always better at the margins, even if the 
marginal usefulness of speech declines, as it does for all 
commodities.  No campaign ever makes a conscious decision to 
simply remove their candidate from the airwaves, newspapers, and 
the internet, or to unilaterally disarm.  But from a societal 
viewpoint, it is becoming clear that at certain levels of campaign 
speech, it becomes so ubiquitous and so commoditized that it loses 
its effectiveness.134 
And yet, candidates for political and even judicial office face ever-
increasing demands to engage in more and more campaign speech.  
This, in turn, has led to ever-increasing pressure to raise money, 
surely one of the most unpleasant tasks facing campaigners.  The 
late Hubert Humphrey called it “a disgusting, degrading, 
demeaning experience.”135  But raising large sums of money has 
become essential to seeking public office, and almost from the very 
moment that an election victory is secured, candidates must begin 
the cycle anew, often raising money the morning after an election 
victory, giving rise to the coinage of the phrase “permanent 
campaign.”136 
In addition to the disamenity value from the candidates’ point of 
view, the compulsion to raise money poses a more serious public 
policy problem in terms of competing for the incumbent politician’s 
time, a point raised by Professor Vincent Blasi over a decade ago.137  
Candidates routinely miss important activities, such as floor votes 
on important legislation, so they can raise more money.138  A recent 
 
134 It has become widely noted that trends seem to indicate a growing disillusionment on 
the part of the voting electorate with the political campaign process generally.  Richard L. 
Hasen, Clipping Coupons For Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign 
Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1996). 
135 HAMILTON, supra note 118. 
136 See, e.g., Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann, Preface to THE PERMANENT 
CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE, at vii (Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann eds., 2000); James 
A. Thurber, Is the Permanent Campaign Alive and Well After 9/11?, available at 
http://spa.american.edu/ccps/getpdf.php?table=publications&ID=47 (last visited Jan. 7, 2006). 
137 Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign 
Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 
1282 (1994) (“A major goal of campaign finance reform is coming to be—and surely ought to 
be—to protect the time of elected representatives and candidates for office.”). 
138 During the 2004 presidential campaign cycle, Democratic presidential hopeful Dick 
Gephardt, for example, missed 85% of the House floor votes for the first part of 2003, and 
eventual nominee John Kerry missed 37% of all recorded votes in the Senate.  Juliet Eilperin, 
Gephardt, Kerry Miss the Most Hill Votes; Two Draw Focus of Republicans Tallying Absences 
of White House Hopefuls, WASH. POST, June 1, 2003, at A04.  Former Congressman Lee 
Hamilton, as Director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University, has lamented that 
“[t]he money chase distorts the political process, crowding out other activities like writing 
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survey of 2200 federal, state, and local candidates reported that 
more than half of those running for statewide office and 
approximately 43 percent of those running for the House spent at 
least one-quarter of their time raising money,139 while over twenty 
three percent spent more than half of their time raising money.140 
Failure to keep pace with an opponent in fundraising allows the 
opponent to use airwaves to define the campaign, monopolize public 
attention, and worst of all, launch attacks that go unanswered.  
Therein lies the paradox: candidates must raise more and more 
money to engage in more and more campaign speech, but are 
finding their speech increasingly ineffective in reaching the hearts 
and minds of voters.  It is an arms race of campaign fundraising and 
spending. 
There are a number of similarities between the overfishing 
problem and the campaign finance problem that illustrate the 
dynamics of a tragedy of the commons.  Both involve a rival 
resource.  In the case of overfishing, the resource is obviously the 
fish stock, while in the campaign finance problem the resource is 
the ability of political candidates to reach the hearts and minds of 
voters.  Both involve the degradation of this resource.  In fishing, 
the fish stock deteriorates, while in the campaign finance context 
voter interest in campaign messages is lost. 
Both problems involve an overexploitation of the resource.  Just 
as fishermen take too many fish, political candidates go to the 
airwaves too often to try and get a message across to voters.  
Because more speech is always better from the viewpoint of an 
individual candidate, the incentive is for the candidate to speak 
until she has no more money left in her campaign coffers.  In 
essence, candidates are wasting the resource by using it too 
intensively and too often. 
In both situations, individual short-term interests conflict with 
collective long-term interests.  In both situations, the rational 
course of action from the individual viewpoint is to continue to 
exploit and ruin the resource.  This is due in part to the fact that if 
any one individual refrains, she cannot count on other individuals to 
 
laws, thinking about public policy, or meeting with ordinary voters.”  HAMILTON, supra note 
118. 
139 Peter L. Francia, Begging for Bucks—Campaign Fundraising, Apr. 2001, 
http://www.findarticles.com. 
140 Paul S. Herrnson & Ronald A. Faucheux, Candidates Devote Substantial Time and 
Effort to Fundraising, July 7, 2000, http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/herrnson/reporttime.html; 
see also Blasi, supra note 137, at 1281–82 (citing fund-raising statistics). 
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also refrain.  The result would be that while the resource is ruined, 
the refraining individual is the only one that does not enjoy the 
temporary benefit of the ruination of the resource.  Campaigning 
politicians face this dilemma.  There is no incentive to ever refrain 
from campaigning, or to stop raising money to do it.  While 
campaigning politicians spend less effectively the more they spend, 
high-minded abstention would still be tantamount to capitulation.  
But in the long run, all candidates have contributed to the 
campaign speech malaise of the voting public. 
In the section that follows, I make some observations about the 
campaign speech effort that are similar to those made about fishing 
effort.  Data on campaign spending and voter turnout in U.S. 
federal elections is presented below to illustrate that campaign 
spending and spending effectiveness has followed a pattern similar 
to that of halibut fishing and fishing effort. 
B. U.S. Federal Election Data 
As a proxy for campaign speech effort, I use total dollars spent in 
a federal campaign cycle on U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. 
Senate campaigns.141  There is certainly some inexactness of this 
measure, as there is with using skates to measure fishing effort.  
Some campaigns involve close races that draw more money than 
would otherwise be the case.  Some campaigns, such as those 
conducted by independently wealthy candidates such as 1996 
Senate candidate Michael Huffington and Senators Jon Corzine and 
Herb Kohl, draw upon huge private reserves of money.142  However, 
money remains a better proxy than any other conceivable measure 
of campaigning effort.  Data on person-hours spent on the campaign 
trail, or on fundraising efforts, even if it existed, would be 
unreliable. 
Data on U.S. federal elections from 1976 to 2002 is used for 
analysis.  This period is bounded by two major changes in the law 
on campaign finance: Buckley v. Valeo was decided in 1976, 
upholding most of the provisions of the 1974 Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA).143  In 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign 
 
141 I also analyzed data on campaign receipts, and the empirical findings did not change. 
142 See Paul A. Clark, Self-Financing of Senate Candidates, 1950–2000: Have Campaign 
Finance Laws Affected the Behavior of Wealthy Candidates? (unpublished comment), 
available at  http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/student-papers/Clark.pdf (last visited Jan. 
7, 2006). 
143 424 U.S. 1, 143–44 (1976). 
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Reform Act (BCRA),144 popularly known as the McCain-Feingold Act 
(after the Senate sponsors) or the Shays-Meehan Act (after the 
House sponsors), was passed and took effect on November 6, 2002, 
the day after Election Day.145  The BCRA was upheld in large part 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC.146  The BCRA had 
many effects, but for our purposes the most important were to raise 
individual contribution limits to candidates for federal office from 
$1,000 to $2,000,147 and to limit the use of soft money as a source of 
funding in campaigns.148  It would be inappropriate to compare 
expenditure data from before and after the BCRA because the 
difference between direct contributions of $1,000 and $2,000, as well 
as differences in soft money contributions, could skew the 
fundraising data.  While the Federal Election Commission obviously 
continued to make significant rulings during this period from 1978 
to 2002, I assume that there were no changes in the legal 
environment with respect to campaign fundraising and spending 
that would bias results. 
Presidential election years are different from midterm federal 
election years in both spending and voter turnout.  Campaign 
spending is greater in high-profile competitive election years, such 
as presidential election years, and these years also experience 
increased voter turnout.149  The result is that campaign spending 
efficiency—measured in terms of votes per dollar spent—is 
invariably greater in presidential years.  For illustrative purposes, I 
divide the data into two sets, shown in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
144 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 
(codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.A.) (West 2005)). 
145 Id. § 402(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 112. 
146 540 U.S. 93, 188–89 (2003). 
147 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 307(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 102 (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 
441a(a)(1)(A)). 
148 Id. § 323(a)–(b), 116 Stat. at 82 (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i) (requiring political 
committees to follow the monetary limitation for contributions in the Act).  Specifically, the 
BCRA limited an individual’s aggregate contribution to $37,500 for candidates and their 
committees and $57,500 for all other types of contributions.  Id. § 307(b), 116 Stat. at 102–03 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(3)). 
149 Jeffery Milyo, The Political Economics of Campaign Finance, 3 INDEP. REV. 537, 544 
(1999), available at http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir_03_4_milyo.pdf (discussing trends in 
voter turnout as related to campaign spending for various types of elections). 
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TABLE 5 
 
Campaign Expenditures in U.S. House and Senate Campaigns, 
Presidential Election Years150 
 
Year 
Total dollars 
spent (2002 
dollars) 
Voter turnout 
(adjusted for 
2002 voter 
registration) 
Votes per 
dollar 
spent 
1976 $309,375,000 106,919,135 0.346 
1980 $417,706,446 105,496,502 0.253 
1984 $553,907,457 102,279,658 0.185 
1988 $618,600,300   98,956,292 0.160 
1992 $637,897,436 105,649,989 0.166 
1996 $715,896,552   96,857,224 0.135 
2000 $886,197,917 104,300,496 0.118 
 
TABLE 6 
 
Campaign Expenditures in U.S. House and Senate Campaigns, 
Midterm Election Years151 
 
Year 
Total dollars 
spent (2002 
dollars) 
Voter turnout 
(adjusted for  
2002 voter 
registration) 
Votes per 
dollar 
spent 
1978 $426,388,889 79,533,230 0.187 
1982 $533,507,393 81,684,886 0.153 
1986 $655,829,152 74,486,037 0.114 
1990 $533,780,822 76,766,507 0.144 
1994 $714,536,585 80,935,063 0.113 
1998 $674,076,923 75,510,851 0.112 
2002 $770,180,000 78,390,424 0.102 
 
Two adjustments are made to the data: the Consumer Price Index152 
 
150 Data on file with author. 
151 Data on file with author. 
152 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Indexes, 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) (providing a hyperlink to an “Inflation 
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is used to adjust dollar figures for inflation,153 and Census Bureau 
data is used to adjust voter turnout data for growth in the voting-
age population.154 
Certainly, the nature of campaign spending has changed 
dramatically during this period.  To reach voters, politicians have 
used buttons, signposts, bumper stickers, radio and television 
advertising, telephone solicitations, and internet advertising.  This 
is no different from fishing; different fishing technologies have made 
fishing more efficient and more destructive over time.  Similarly, 
television and internet access have clearly been great technological 
advances, but overuse of these technologies for campaign 
advertising has likewise reduced their usefulness. 
There are clearly similarities between this data and that shown in 
Table 4 for halibut fishing.  As with the data on pounds of halibut 
landed, there is no clear downward trend in voter turnout over time 
which might lead some to discount the importance of the problems.  
In both data sets, however, there is an observable upward trend in 
expenditures, and an observable downward trend in efficiency, as 
measured by catch per skate and by votes per dollar.  The data from 
Tables 5 and 6 are set out in Figure 5.  The halibut fishing data 
from Table 4 is set out in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculator” to convert past dollar buying power into current dollar buying power). 
153 The direct contribution limit under FECA remained at $1,000 for the entire period 
between 1978 and 2002.  2 U.S.C.A § 431(8)(B)(i)–(iv) (West 2005).  Therefore, an argument 
could be made that no adjustment for inflation should be made at all.  Not adjusting for 
inflation would render the argument in this article stronger. 
154 Estimates on the number of voting-age Americans, and data on voter registration are 
compiled from the Census Bureau.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 
NOVEMBER 2004 AND EARLIER REPORTS, available at http://www.census.gov/population/ 
socdemo/voting/tabA-1.xls (last visited Feb. 4, 2005). 
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FIGURE 5 
Votes Per Dollar Spent 
 
FIGURE 6 
Pacific Halibut Catch Per Skate (lbs/skate) 
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Although the similar downward trends in campaign spending 
efficiency and fishing efficiency are obvious, there are a number of 
possible explanations for this trend in campaign expenditure 
efficiency, other than the existence of an inexorable tragedy of the 
commons.  Given the small number of observations, it is impossible 
to conclusively test a hypothesis concerning the causes of decreasing 
campaign spending effectiveness.  The data from presidential-year 
and midterm-year elections, however, can be pooled using a dummy 
variable to capture the differential effects, and the resulting 
fourteen observations will permit us to at least entertain some 
suggestions. 
One alternative explanation is that increasing income has led to 
more disposable income which can be used to fund campaigns; this 
leads to more money being pumped into the political campaign 
effort.  If this were true, then there is no market failure because 
increased campaign spending is simply a reflection of this particular 
effect of greater disposable income. 
Another alternative explanation is that increased campaign 
spending is simply due to increased advertising expenditures.  It 
could be that political candidates are simply spending more money 
because it takes more to compete with potato chip commercials or 
automobile commercials.  This does not, however, necessarily 
preclude a tragedy of the commons explanation; it may simply 
reflect the possibility that campaign speech and advertising are all 
caught up in a tragedy of the commons. 
Another possible alternative is that increased competitiveness of 
certain races has accentuated their importance, and led to an 
infusion of money into these races.  Statistical analysis of this 
hypothesis seems to point the other way.  In the econometric model 
that is described below, various models were estimated using a 
variable to measure the competitiveness of congressional races.  In 
no estimation did the competitiveness variable yield a statistically 
significant relationship.  Moreover, other available evidence 
suggests that federal campaigns have become less competitive, not 
more; incumbency re-election rates have been increasing for 
decades.155 
Another possible alternative explanation is that voters have been 
 
155 Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition for 
U.S. House Elections, http://www.emergingdemocraticmajorityweblog.com/spsa/spsa.html 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2006); REDISH, supra note 127, at 36; PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL 
ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN WASHINGTON 28–34 (2004); John A. Ferejohn, On 
the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 166, 166 (1977). 
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turned off by a number of factors other than campaign spending.  
One might argue, for example, that an increase in political 
partisanship has soured voters and caused them to turn out in lower 
numbers.  This theory, however, runs counter to the evidence 
available; political party identity seems to be on the decline.156  If 
one takes party loyalty as a measure of partisanship, then one can 
say that partisanship has been decreasing, not increasing, over 
time. 
Although there are many possible alternatives to the decrease in 
campaign spending effectiveness, some scholars have developed 
theories that explain the overall growth of campaign spending. 
Professor John Lott has empirically tested the hypothesis that the 
growth in the size of government has accounted for the growth in 
the amount of campaign spending.157  This hypothesis is not 
inconsistent with the hypothesis advanced in this Article.  To the 
extent that Lott is claiming that there are increasing favors to be 
gotten from helping to fund elections, and that this has led to 
increasing attempts to curry favor with aspiring politicians,158 it is 
only natural that voters would be disillusioned with the degree of 
campaign spending, recognizing it for what it is: a symptom of the 
growing influence of money over political institutions.  Lott’s 
prescription, to shrink the size of government, is not necessarily 
inconsistent with prescriptions for solving the tragedy of campaign 
spending commons, though Lott is clear in his conviction that any 
other prescription would merely be addressing symptoms and not 
root causes.159  The suggestive findings in this Article are not 
inconsistent with those of Lott's. 
A test for the effect of a tragedy of the commons can be 
accomplished by regressing the reciprocal of campaign spending 
efficiency—dollar spent per vote for U.S. House and Senate 
campaigns—against a simple time trend variable, the election year.  
The general form of the model estimated is:  
 
 
156 See, e.g., Russell J. Dalton, The Decline of Party Identifications, in PARTIES WITHOUT 
PARTISANS: POLITICAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES 19, 22–23 (Russell J. 
Dalton & Martin P. Wattenberg eds., 2000). 
157 See generally John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures 
Are Increasing: The Government is Getting Bigger, 43 J. L. & ECON. 359 (2000) (discussing 
how higher government spending, as a result of larger government, causes increases in 
campaign expenditures). 
158 Id. at 363. 
159 Id. at 360.  Lott warns that attempting to restrict contributions would simply force 
would-be contributors to substitute in-kind contributions for monetary donations.  Id. at 362. 
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Campaign Expend/Vote = ß0 + ß1 PresDummy + ß2Year +  
     ß2 ln GDP + ß3 ln Ad Expenditures. 
The dependent variable is thus the reciprocal of the campaign 
spending efficiency.  PresDummy is a dummy variable indicating an 
election taking place in a presidential election year.  GDP is per 
capita income, in 2000 dollars,160 and Ad Expenditures is the total 
amount of money spent nationally on advertising, also adjusted for 
inflation.161  I used the natural logarithm for these two variables.162  
Therefore, a positive coefficient on the year variable represents the 
decreasing effectiveness, over time, of campaign spending.  As noted 
above, I also estimated models that included a variable to measure 
competitiveness of congressional races.  A statistically significant 
relationship may suggest that increased campaign spending is the 
result of more races being competitive.  The variable I used was the 
percentage of races in which the winning margin was below a 
certain threshold.  I used thresholds of 5%, 7.5%, and 10%.  None of 
these cases yielded a variable with any statistical significance.  
Since this competitiveness variable did not contribute to 
explanatory power, it was omitted from other estimations.  The 
results of the estimated models are shown in Table 7 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 The GDP in 2000 dollars may be obtained from a website provided by Economic History 
Services.  Economic History Services, What Was The GDP Then?, http://www.eh.net/hmit/gdp 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (providing GDP information from and citing to Louis Johnston & 
Samuel H. Williamson, The Annual Real and Nominal GDP for the United States, 1789–
Present (2004)). 
161 National advertising data is obtained from ROBERT J. COEN, UNIVERSAL MCMANN, 
INSIDER’S REPORT: ROBERT COEN PRESENTATION ON ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES (June 2005), 
available at http://www.universalmccann.com. 
162 A Box-Cox test indicated that a linear model might also provide a fit, but empirically, 
the log-linear models provided slightly more predictive models.  A Box-Cox linearity plot is 
often used to transform the X variable, which can help to improve the linear fit between X and 
Y.  NIST/SEMATECH, ENGINEERING STATISTICS HANDBOOK § 1.3.3.5, available at 
http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/eda/section3/boxcoxli.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2006). 
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TABLE 7 
Dependent variable: Campaign Expenditures/Vote 
 
 
 
Model 1 
Year only 
 
 
 
Model 2 
Advertising 
only 
 
 
Model 3 
GDP only 
 
 
Model 4 
All 
 
 
R2 
 
0.90 0.93 0.89 0.96 
 
Adjusted 
R2 
 
0.88 0.92 0.87 0.94 
 
Intercept 
 
-369.6 
(-7.90) 
-61.8 
(-8.92) 
-86.9 
(-7.20) 
-422.4 
(-2.26) 
 
Presidential 
Election 
Dummy 
 
-1.73 
(-4.57) 
-1.78 
(-5.73) 
-1.77 
(-4.56) 
-1.76 
(-6.42) 
 
Year 
 
0.190 
(8.07)   
0.250 
(2.04) 
 
ln Ad 
Expend 
 
 
5.77 
(10.06)  
10.84 
(3.45) 
 
ln GDP 
 
  
9.27 
(7.85) 
-20.96 
(-2.30) 
N=14; t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
With just 14 observations, these results can only be considered 
suggestive.  But the signs of coefficients rarely switch, and the 
coefficient for the dummy for presidential election years is very 
consistent.  These results point us towards some interesting 
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inferences.  First, the time trend variable is positive and significant, 
and the coefficients of similar magnitude in both models 1 and 4 
indicate that we may at least entertain the suggestion that 
declining efficiency over time is indicative of a tragedy of the 
commons pattern of campaign fundraising and spending.  Second, 
the best explanatory variable is ln Ad Expenditures.  Does this 
suggest that campaign spending has been increasing only because 
general advertising expenditures are increasing?  This is possible, 
but if true, would not render less plausible the hypothesis that 
campaign spending efficiency is a tragedy of the commons.  It would 
be entirely consistent to offer a complementary hypothesis that 
advertising spending in general follows a tragedy of the commons 
pattern.  Since private rents from advertising are so high, however, 
this is likely to be tolerated for a longer time by private advertising 
spenders. 
It is interesting to compare these results with those obtained by 
Lott.  Using a slightly different specification, Lott found a highly 
significant relationship between campaign spending and 
government size, but Lott’s regressions also found a significant time 
trend relationship.163  Since Lott’s regressions were simply trying to 
control for time-sensitive effects, he did not comment on the 
significance of his time trend variable.164 
I am not prepared to make the strong claim that I have proven 
that the tragedy of the commons fully explains spiraling campaign 
spending.  Strictly speaking, this latter proposition would be 
difficult to conclusively prove, requiring the rejection of all other 
possible and incompatible explanations.  The combination of 
anecdotal evidence and the statistical inferences in this case, 
however, should give us reason to consider the possibility carefully.  
Does a tragedy of the commons explanation seem more or less likely 
than the alternative explanations?  Does it ring true that we are 
pouring money into campaigns, and candidates are pouring effort 
into fundraising and spending simply because we are wealthier and 
can afford it?  Perhaps spiraling advertising costs are to blame, 
representing its own tragedy of the commons that has spilled over 
into the political arena.  But in all of the hand-wringing by 
politicians and by pundits and concerned citizen groups over 
campaign spending, not one, to my knowledge, invokes increased 
advertising expenses as the root cause of spiraling campaign 
 
163 Lott, supra note 157, at 381, 383. 
164 Id. at 383 n.44, 384 (focusing his analysis on the budget expenditure variables). 
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spending. 
Future research may involve data in which the time trends in 
GDP data or advertising data can be separated out.  In the 
meantime, we should be willing to acknowledge that perhaps we are 
facing too much campaign speech and too much campaign spending.  
Ultimately, our political candidates do not benefit from unfettered 
rights to raise and spend money. 
C. Is U.S. Campaign Spending “Excessive”? 
In order for campaign spending to be a tragedy of the commons 
problem, campaign spending must be excessive in the way that 
halibut fishing was excessive and unsustainable.  Many scholars in 
the field of campaign finance balk at the suggestion that campaign 
spending and concomitant campaign advertising is in any sense of 
the word “excessive.”  The problem with campaign spending, as 
Professors Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres have argued, is that 
most campaigns are underfinanced, and not overfinanced.165  As 
Ackerman and Ayres note, campaign expenditures for the 2000 
election cycle totaled $3 billion, while in 1999 automobile 
advertisement expenditures alone totaled $13 billion, and total TV 
advertising expenditures totaled $66 billion.166  Critics of campaign 
finance reform, of course, chime in with more examples of 
expenditures on trivial goods and how they dwarf political campaign 
expenditures.167 
In terms of raw spending amounts, perhaps Ackerman and Ayres 
are right in arguing that $3 billion is too small a sum to be spending 
on a matter far more important than the type of automobiles we 
buy, or the sum total of all the other fairly trivial consumer 
expenditure decisions we make that result in the spending of $66 
billion in advertising per year.  The conclusion, however, must be 
 
165 BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 85 & 261 n.27 (2002) (citing a study by fourteen campaign finance experts 
for the proposition that Americans are not spending “‘too much’ on political campaigns”); see 
also TASK FORCE ON CAMPAIGN REFORM, WOODROW WILSON SCH. OF PUB. & INT’L AFFAIRS, 
PRINCETON UNIV., CAMPAIGN REFORM: INSIGHTS AND EVIDENCE (1998) (stating “one of the 
primary problems with the current American system of campaign finance is not too much 
spending, but too little”), available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~lbartels/ 
campaignreform; Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review of Voting 
With Dollars, 91 CAL. L. REV. 643, 647–48 (2003) (stating that public funding for presidential 
candidates is underfunded and most jurisdictions lack funding for congressional candidates). 
166 ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 165, at 85. 
167 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 122, at 42 (noting that Americans spend two to three times 
more on potato chips than on political campaigns). 
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more nuanced than that.  Ackerman and Ayres fully recognize that 
the problem is the taint of the money that is used to fund these 
campaign expenditures—hence their ingenious proposal to establish 
a secret donation booth for campaign donations, funded by 
government-provided “Patriot” dollars.168 
Thus, more spending on campaign speech is not necessarily bad, 
provided that it is funded by the right type of sources.  The amount 
of campaign speech and spending of the nature currently 
predominant, however, is not a good or effective thing, precisely for 
the reasons that Ackerman and Ayres and others have recognized: 
the lack of credibility associated with campaign speech that seems 
too closely tied to unseemly interests.  Additionally, John Lott’s 
argument that campaign expenditures are rising because of the 
growth of federal and state government seems to concede that 
voters view money as a corrupting influence, since this causal 
relationship implies a quid pro quo in large campaign contributions 
by large donors. 
An economic analysis illustrates this point.  Ackerman and Ayres 
lament that campaign spending is less than one-fourth of spending 
on automobile advertisements.  This is exactly what we would 
expect, however.  Automobile advertising is a private good, as 
opposed to the public good of campaign speech; at least that is what 
the pretense is.  Assuming that auto advertising and the campaign 
advertising expenditures can be modeled as declining-marginal 
benefit enterprises with constant marginal costs (as Gordon 
modeled overfishing)169 a comparison of the two markets reveals 
that the higher marginal and average products of auto advertising, 
owing to the private nature of its rents, is higher than that of 
campaign advertising.  This is shown in Figure 7. 
 
168 ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 165, at 25–31, 95–97. 
169 See supra Figure 4 and accompanying text. 
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Congress.  The higher level of campaign advertising is thus a signal 
to the voter that average productivity of campaign dollars has 
increased, and that unsavory, if perfectly legal, funding sources are 
involved. 
The Ackerman and Ayres proposal to attempt to infuse campaign 
speech with more frequent speech, more meaningful speech, and 
less cynical perceptions on the part of voters is an ingenious one.  
Like most public funding proposals, they attempt to infuse 
campaign dollars into those campaigns that need and deserve it the 
most—those meritorious yet underfunded candidates that face a 
political machine with generous private funding sources that benefit 
from the incumbent’s power.  At the same time, it raises the bar for 
private giving to incumbents with less noble motivations for seeking 
and maintaining public office, such as a payback position upon 
retirement.172  The dual effects of this proposal are to subsidize 
those for whom campaign spending tends to be too low and 
discourage giving to those for whom campaign spending tends to be 
too lavish, while at the same time flattening differences in spending 
between well-endowed and poorly-endowed candidates without 
utilizing a command-and-control type of public financing system 
that most reformers advocate.  Essentially, the Ackerman and Ayres 
proposal provides the advantage of not having any governmental 
funding decisions at all. 
This proposal, however, does not say that campaign spending is 
too low and thus not a tragedy of the commons.  Rather, it is an 
acknowledgement that some form of public funding of political 
campaigns would serve to improve the efficiency of campaign dollars 
spent.  That is, it could be that campaign speech is only excessive 
because it is perceived by the voter to be tainted.  The presence of 
the taint is what renders current levels of campaign speech 
excessive.  Ackerman and Ayres’ proposal to remove the taint by 
way of a form of public financing—a form that engages the public by 
involving it with distributional decisions—is thus aimed at flipping 
the campaign speech world from the incredible to the credible, but it 
does not, in the long run, relieve the candidates and the public from 
 
Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 541, 542–43 (1994); Abramowitz et al., supra note 155; see also supra note 155 and 
accompanying text (discussing the rise in incumbency re-election rates). 
172 Billy Tauzin retired in 2004 after twelve terms as a Congressman to head up the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, a drug industry trade group, a 
position for which he will receive a $2 million salary.  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Washington Talk; 
Lawmaker’s Plans to Lobby Raises Issue of Crossing Line, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2004, at A12. 
HSU (FINAL2).DOC 2/20/2006  7:06:24 PM 
2005] What Is a Tragedy of the Commons? 125 
the inexorable push to engage in a fundraising and spending derby. 
Indeed, it is possible that we would find, contrary to Ackerman and 
Ayres’ suspicions, that less money is required to launch an effective 
campaign once the taint of money is removed. 
V. WHY DON’T RESOURCE USERS WANT TO BE SAVED FROM 
THEMSELVES? 
The most interesting question raised by true tragedies of the 
commons is why it has proven so difficult to save resource users 
from their own self-destructive behavior. In many cases, it is a 
simple problem of the prohibitive transaction costs of cooperation, 
especially in large, atomistic groups of resource users. This would 
include the costs of enforcement, and the risks that enforcement 
would be ineffectual. But in too many instances to be dismissed, 
transaction costs are not prohibitive, can be overcome, and clearly 
do not represent the obstacle to cooperation.  The question in these 
cases is, if resource users benefit from limits on their own behavior, 
why don’t resource users demand regulation? 
In some instances, they do.  In The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, Stigler illustrated how some regulated industries came 
about by the co-option of government by industries seeking 
protection from new entry and competition.173  A less cynical view of 
Stigler’s theory might be that resource users sought the 
government’s “coercive” powers to arrest wasteful 
overexploitation.174  In other instances, even in the absence of 
governmental regulation, resource users coordinate behavior to 
avoid wasteful overexploitation as studied by Elinor Ostrom and 
others.175  Nonetheless, the reality is that often the tragedies of the 
commons are not solved despite the obvious and sometimes huge 
gains to be had. 
Economists have some difficulty explaining the persistence of 
tragedies of the commons that remain unsolved by coordination or 
regulation.  Explaining this persistence seems to require some 
relaxation of assumptions of rationality, and some concessions to 
behavioral economists.  Professor Barton Thompson has applied 
behavioral psychology literature to environmental tragedies of the 
 
173 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 
3–6 (1971). 
174 Stigler’s view of government and rent-seeking by regulated industries was based upon 
the one thing government can offer industries: its “power to coerce.”  Id. at 4. 
175 See generally OSTROM, supra note 2. 
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commons, most notably to the tragedies of overfishing and 
groundwater overdrafting.176  Thompson attempted to explain why 
so many environmental tragedies of the commons have remained 
unresolved, and why, given the tremendous potential gains, we do 
not see more cooperation or regulation.177  Thompson has found 
much of the answer to be that resource users harbor a variety of 
pathologies causing them to oppose any sort of cooperative or 
regulatory arrangement that would extricate them from their 
particular tragedy.178  Roughly, the pathologies fall into three 
categories: the difficulty of giving up perceived rights, self-serving 
notions of fairness, and undue optimism.179 
In the case of fisheries, fishermen, like most other people, are 
inherently skeptical when asked to surrender a current right in 
exchange for a future benefit even if the potential advantage is 
immense.180  Thus, curtailing fishing effort, even if the benefit 
would be a healthier stock to fish in the future, is viewed as a 
sacrifice even if the net result is a gain.  It could be, as Thompson 
argues, that people simply frame gains and losses differently, 
discounting future gains relative to current losses.181  Or it could be 
that an “endowment effect”182 causes people to hold onto their 
perceived entitlements with irrational stubbornness. 
Transportation planners would sympathize with this dilemma 
because in solving traffic problems, they must deal with drivers who 
want traffic problems solved without giving up their right to drive.  
There is a reason that the most popular solutions involve more 
government provisions, such as more roads or more subsidization of 
transit services, and rarely impose any costs upon drivers.183  One 
study found that some drivers even resent high-occupancy vehicle 
lanes as “special treatment” for other drivers, failing to recognize 
that they could pick up a passenger and become eligible 
themselves.184 
 
176 Thompson, supra note 35, at 256–62. 
177 Id. at 256–57. 
178 Id. at 260–62. 
179 Id. at 258–65. 
180 Id. at 256 (asserting that most proposed solutions to commons tragedies, such as caps 
on use, are viewed as current losses rather than long-term gains). 
181 Id. at 256–57. 
182 See Thaler, supra note 56, at 44 (1980). 
183 Legislatures have typically indulged constituents by offering tax incentives rather than 
taxes to curb externality-imposing activities like driving.  Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the 
Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685, 688 (2002). 
184 Strahilevitz, supra note 75, at 1239. 
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Fixing resource and environmental problems often requires an 
allocation of burdens.  This task engenders self-serving “egocentric 
interpretations of fairness” which inhibit agreements that must be 
made before getting to the solutions.185  Cooperation to solve even 
the most pressing problems is elusive.  Canada’s Pacific halibut 
fishery provides a case in point.  The fishery had become overfished 
as early as 1980, giving rise to economist Peter Pearse’s prescription 
of adopting an individual transferable quota program to curb 
overfishing.186  The fishermen themselves recognized the need to 
adopt an individual transferable quota program, but could not agree 
on an initial allocation of the quota.187  Only an ultimatum by the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, who threatened to impose 
much more draconian measures, brought the fishermen back to the 
bargaining table, from which they eventually emerged with an 
agreement on how to allocate the quota.188 
The human propensity to blame also plays into this fairness 
pathology and has a role in preventing cooperation.  Fishing 
industries and fishing communities have trouble refraining from 
overfishing and have trouble agreeing on a cooperative solution 
because they remain fixated on the role that others have had in 
contributing to the problem.189  Even if cooperation and sacrifice are 
in the best interests of the resource users, it has often proven to be 
too galling to undertake if they harbor a perception, accurate or not, 
that someone else’s behavior was to blame for the problem in the 
first place.190 
Finally, resource users deal with uncertainty in ways that are not 
conducive to conservation or cooperation.  When faced with even the 
smallest of short-term sacrifices, people have an amazing capacity 
to project incredible optimism with respect to scientifically 
 
185 Thompson, supra note 35, at 260. 
186 See COMM’N ON PAC. FISHERIES POLICY, CAN. DEP’T OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS, TURNING 
THE TIDE: A NEW POLICY FOR CANADA’S PACIFIC FISHERIES 121–25 (1982).  Individual quota 
programs regulate fishing by licensing fishing to a specified quantity per quota.  The 
quantity-based license cures the incentive to overfish in order to maximize profits by limiting 
the total possible catch.  Furthermore, the transferability motivates less efficient fishermen to 
exit the fishery, which alleviates the overcapitalization problem.  See Shi-Ling Hsu & James 
E. Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
799, 807–09 (1997). 
187 SUZANNE IUDICELLO ET AL., FISH, MARKETS, AND FISHERMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF 
OVERFISHING 148–49 (1999). 
188 Id. at 149. 
189 Thompson, supra note 35, at 261. 
190 Id. at 262. 
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uncertain outcomes.191  Fishermen seem to have a penchant for 
adopting the most optimistic estimates of fish stocks.192  Moreover, 
people seem to be more confident than their abilities warrant.  In 
the case of fishermen, regulation is often resisted because they 
cherish the opportunity to compete against each other,193 many of 
them because they harbor an elevated perception of their fishing 
skills vis-à-vis other fishermen.194  In short, uncertainty is almost 
never resolved in a way that invites cooperation or regulation. 
All of these propensities are, in some sense, pathological.  But for 
even the casual observer of human nature, these explanations of 
why people ignore their own long-term interests ring remarkably 
true.  People often very strongly prefer the broken system they 
know, to the quite possibly superior system they do not know, even 
if they recognize that they are trapped in a tragic spiral. 
Campaign finance and spending reform has been hostage to the 
same fears of the unknown.  Campaigning politicians are loath to 
give up the freedom to spend more time raising money and to spend 
more money in a campaign.  Similar to the fishermen discussed 
above, campaigning politicians blame everyone but themselves for 
their current plight, further inhibiting the search for solutions.  
Given the nature of those seeking elected office, one would not be 
surprised to learn that campaigning politicians invariably think 
they can better their opposition at fundraising. 
Opposition to the BCRA provides an example.  The problems 
targeted by the BCRA are different from the overspending problem 
discussed above, but the soft money problem targeted by the BCRA 
has its own tragedy of the commons dynamic.  The upward spiraling 
importance and quantity of soft money in politics gives rise to tragic 
dynamics similar to those described above.  Not only politicians but 
also interest groups faced with increasing soft money expectations 
should have seen merit in regulation.  And yet opposition to the 
BCRA was widespread among interest groups, including the AFL-
CIO,195 the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Right to 
Life Committee, the Christian Coalition, the American Heart 
 
191 Id. at 258–65. 
192 Id. at 258 (“If scientists estimate that there are between one thousand and thirty 
thousand fish in any given population, most fishermen assume that there are thirty thousand 
fish in that population.”). 
193 Id. at 245. 
194 Id. at 244. 
195 William O’Rourke, Editorial, Grieving Democrats Quietly Fade Into Insignificance, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, Mar. 27, 2001, at 33. 
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Association, and various chambers of commerce, just to name a few 
of the strange bedfellows.196  Congressional campaigners, 
presumably the beneficiaries of regulation that would limit the 
amount of soft money fundraising they would have to conduct, have 
themselves been extremely critical of election financing.197  
Congressman Albert R. Wynn (D-MD), an African-American, 
opposed the BCRA because he believed that the soft money ban 
would impair the ability of black candidates and elected black 
representatives to fund “get-out-the-vote” drives and voter 
registration activities.198  He maintains this view despite the reality 
that the overwhelming majority of soft money is contributed by 
regulated industries to further their economic interests,199 thus 
conferring substantially more advantages on white candidates than 
black candidates.200  On the other side of the aisle, Republicans 
opposed the bill because of its lack of prohibitions on labor union 
activity in soliciting soft money for party activities;201 this, despite 
the widely held belief that a ban on soft money would amplify their 
advantage in hard money donations over the Democrats.202  At every 
turn, opposition to the BCRA has come from those with worst-case 
suspicions of how the legislation would work to their detriment. 
And yet, some have recognized the need for mutual coercion.  
Former Senator Zell Miller wrote in an op-ed about his support for 
the BCRA: 
Make no mistake about it: When it comes to winning political 
races by raising millions of dollars and buying lots of TV 
time, I’m as competitive as they come. I’ve done it three 
times in a row now—once for the Senate and twice for 
governor—and it’s the formula for success in politics today. 
But frankly, it’s a rotten formula, and the rules of this game 
 
196 Vanessa Blum, Senate Showdown: Battle Shifts on Finance Reform, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 
19, 2001, at 1, 14. 
197 PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN 
WASHINGTON 284 (2004). 
198 Interview by Kwame Holman with Representative Albert R. Wynn (D-MD), Debating 
Reform (July 11,2001), http://www.pbs.org /newshour/bb/congress/july-dec01/cfr-a_7-11.html 
(last visited October 3, 2005). 
199 HERRNSON, supra note 197, at 295. 
200 Id. at 285, 295. 
201 Joe Salkowski, Senate Poised To Pass Reform Measure Today, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Apr. 2, 
2001, at 1 (“Other Republicans hoped to peel away Democratic support for the bill with a 
‘paycheck protection’ amendment that would force labor unions and corporations to get 
permission from members and shareholders before spending political cash.”). 
202 Thomas B. Edsall, McCain-Feingold Helps GOP; Party Increases Its Fundraising Lead 
Over Democrats, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2004, at A08. 
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need to change. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . Yes, I know how to play that fundraising game with 
the best of them. Only today, I don’t sleep nearly as well as I 
did years ago in those cheap motel rooms or on supporters’ 
sofas.203 
Implicit in Miller’s op-ed is the recognition that, on some level, he 
enjoys the competitive aspect of raising and spending money.  Like 
fishermen, politicians do not like to admit, publicly or to themselves, 
that they would like to be restrained from competing against each 
other in a game of skill, energy, and aggression, even if it detracts 
from the more important business of legislating and governing.  
Politicians labor under the same self-serving and self-
congratulatory myths that fishermen do.  And yet, at the end of the 
day, both politicians and fishermen understand on some level that 
the rat race just gets worse and worse. 
In the end, of course, the BCRA passed both the House and 
Senate and the President signed it into law on March 27, 2002.204  
In some ways it was surprising that it took as much effort to pass it 
as it did, given that the public perceived that campaign spending, 
especially that procured from soft money, was a corrupting 
influence.205  In fact, campaign finance reform generally receives 
strong public support,206 and the BCRA, as a flashpoint for the 
issue, enjoyed particularly strong support.207  Even if congressional 
opponents of BCRA really believed that this would not ultimately 
solve the problem of tainted soft money, why would they be so 
reluctant to adopt something their constituents so strongly favor?  
The most plausible answer to this is an irrational fear of the devil 
they did not know. 
While the BCRA is not the tragedy of the commons that I identify 
 
203 Zell Miller, A Sorry Way to Win, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2001, at B07. 
204 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 
(codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.A.) (West 2005)). 
205 Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: 
When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 121, 132–33 
(2004). 
206 Id. at 143. 
207 Public opinion polls vary in quality and results, but almost every stage showed support 
for the McCain-Feingold legislation.  The advocacy group Public Campaign commissioned a 
reputable polling group, the Mellman Group, to conduct eight statewide polls on support for 
the bill, and found support ranging from 58 to 75 percent in favor of the McCain-Feingold bill.  
News Center, Another State of the Union, Another Promise for Campaign Finance Reform? 
(Jan. 19, 1999), http://www.commondreams.org/pressreleases/jan99/011999e.htm. 
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in this Article, its close relationship with the campaign spending 
problem illustrates the pervasiveness of the pathological fears that 
thwart solutions. 
VI. SOLVING TRAGEDIES OF THE COMMONS PROBLEMS 
What, then, is to be done about the true tragedies of the commons 
that are at the heart of Hardin’s contribution?  What we have 
learned from the overfishing problem is that it is very difficult to 
control overexploitive behavior without addressing the incentives to 
race.  Fishing regulations governing the use of destructive fishing 
technologies have been fraught with enforcement problems or have 
been met with technological substitutions that have foiled the 
conservation purposes behind the regulations. For example, 
restrictions on boat lengths were met with the entry of rounder and 
more powerful boats,208 while regulations on line lengths were met 
with lines with more hooks.209  Regulations requiring fishing nets to 
be of a minimum mesh size (to allow small fish to escape) were met 
with the practice of intertwining nets to reduce the mesh size.210 
Similarly, seasonal restrictions have only increased the pressure to 
engage in a short but increasingly intense fishing season.  For 
example, the Alaskan halibut fishery was reduced to a two-day 
season composed of two 24-hour fishing seasons,211 and the 
Canadian Pacific halibut fishery was reduced to a six-day season.212 
These absurdly short seasons were simply derbies in which 
fishermen caught as much halibut as possible, paying no regard to 
ecological waste or human safety.213 
The problem is that none of these solutions change the incentive 
to cheat.  Making it more difficult to fish does not change the 
 
208 COMM’N TO REVIEW INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING 
THE FISH: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY ON INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS 116–17 (1999) 
[hereinafter SHARING THE FISH]. 
209 See IUDICELLO ET AL., supra note 187, at 81 (noting that limits on line length are not 
optimal because they do not address the ways around the length limit that can be used to 
achieve the same original result, such as adding more hooks on the lines). 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 137. 
212 Id. at 147. 
213 Id. at 137, 147.  In derby fisheries such as the Canadian Pacific halibut fishery and the 
Alaskan halibut fishery before the advent of quota systems, fishermen routinely worked 
around the clock, elevating risk of injury, while hauling in massive quantities of bycatch—fish 
species other than halibut incidentally caught—and wastefully discarding them.  Id. at 147–
48.  Derby fishing also leaves behind a trail of discarded hooks, lines and nets that continue to 
“ghost fish” by snaring fish outside of any fishing effort at all.  SHARING THE FISH, supra note 
208, at 2–3. 
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fundamental tragedy of the commons dynamics, nor does it change 
the race to overexploit a rivalrous resource and grab as much as 
possible while the resource still exists.  Indeed, many of these 
regulatory courses exacerbate the incentives to cheat, overfish, and 
engage in a race to do so.  Of course, sometimes a property rights-
based solution is also unworkable.  No matter what the regulatory 
regime, however, enforcement and monitoring problems must be 
solved.  But the essential failure of regulators in addressing 
tragedies of the commons is the failure to recognize and address the 
incentives to race to exploit a finite resource that is rivalrous in 
consumption. 
Like Ackerman and Ayres, I applaud the BCRA because it 
attempts the difficult task of trying to control excessive campaign 
behavior rather than throwing up one’s hands and declaring 
defeat.214  And the Ackerman and Ayres proposal, a public financing 
proposal that confers rather than detracts from fundamental 
liberties, is a salve that could buy some valuable time in terms of 
removing the taint of campaign money, making political speech 
more credible. 
But in the end, neither of these schemes addresses the incentives 
of politicians to race to raise money—to try to beat one another even 
in a game that is “disgusting, degrading, [and] demeaning.”215  Nor 
would they save the voting public from a world congested with 
campaign speech.  Even “clean” money, if it buys too much speech, 
will dull the voters’ overloaded senses.  If in fact we are witnessing a 
tragedy of the commons in campaign spending, then arresting it will 
require more than the BCRA and more than what Ackerman and 
Ayres propose.  It will require limitations on the quantity of 
campaign speech, and thus limits on campaign spending.  I am thus 
arguing for some form of limits to campaign spending. 
The argument that we might regulate campaign speech is not as 
radical or as new as one would suppose.  Professor Cass Sunstein 
argued in Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech that the 
distinction between campaign contributions and campaign 
expenditures has turned out to be somewhat illusory.216  Moreover, 
because of the rise of political action committees, the limit on 
 
214 See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 165, at 177–78 (noting that Senators McCain and 
Feingold have shown that Americans care about campaign finance reform, an important first 
step towards meaningful reform). 
215 DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN 
FINANCING IN AMERICA 8 (1975) (quoting Hubert Humphrey). 
216 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 95–96 (1993). 
HSU (FINAL2).DOC 2/20/2006  7:06:24 PM 
2005] What Is a Tragedy of the Commons? 133 
contributions has actually exacerbated some of the problems of 
corruption and taint that the limit was meant to solve.217  Indeed, 
Sunstein argues that these schemes of half-hearted regulation are 
no less a regulatory system than one that might involve 
considerably more governmental involvement, and that replacing it 
is not necessarily unconstitutional.218  More generally, there are 
those that are concerned with economic power being perpetuated or 
even amplified by means of protecting free speech rights that, as a 
practical matter, can only be purchased through large sums of 
money.219  But while these measures have heretofore been justified 
on the grounds that a new balance must be struck, my argument is 
different.  My argument is that no balancing is necessary because 
intervention could be beneficial to those that would be regulated. 
Exactly what form of campaign expenditure limits might be 
needed to truly solve the tragedy of the commons in campaign 
finance and spending is beyond the scope of this Article.  It suffices 
to say, however, that curtailing the incentives to race and 
overadvertise would almost certainly involve curtailing the quantity 
of direct appeals from political candidates through the control of 
their spending.  The overabundance of campaign speech, after all, is 
what causes voters to tune out.  As many have suggested, perhaps 
this curtailment must be coupled with some form of public 
financing.220  We must, after all, attempt to enhance speech and not 
merely quash it.  But limiting candidate access to the public merits 
serious discussion, especially when we recognize that we already 
tolerate a number of abridgements, including those set out in the 
BCRA. 
Several U.S. states have enacted various forms of campaign 
finance reform in an effort to limit influence on elected officials.221  
Canada has had federal campaign spending limitations in effect 
 
217 Id. at 96–97. 
218 Id. at 98–101. 
219 OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF 
STATE POWER 10–11 (1996) (stating that the free speech cases of the seventies allowed those 
with economic power to exert political influence “because they had advanced claims of 
political liberty that easily fit within the received tradition” and that “[m]oney is speech—just 
as much as is picketing or selling a book”). 
220 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 128 (suggesting that regulation is needed to correct 
bias towards well-funded groups). 
221 See Michael Saxl & Maeghan Maloney, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: 
Unintended Consequences and the Maine Solution, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465, 471, 474–76 
(2004) (discussing attempts by Maine, Arizona, and Vermont to reduce the influence of special 
interest groups and campaign contributors on elected officials). 
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since 1974.222  The Canada Elections Act,223 which imposes spending 
limits on parties224 and individual candidates,225 provides fairly 
generous federal subsidies for election expenses,226 and requires 
broadcasters to make primetime air time available for registered 
political parties.227  Interestingly enough, at least one commentator 
has attributed the spending limits and electoral reforms to “an 
agreement to put an end to the upward spiral of election 
spending.”228  The same commentator also noted that 
when combined with a reasonable level of public funding, 
spending limits reduce the pressure for parties and 
candidates to raise funds.  This should not be interpreted to 
mean that parties face no such pressures.  Rather, the 
pressure to raise money is reduced so that candidates do not 
find themselves devoting as significant a portion of their 
time to fundraising as do their American counterparts.  By 
lessening the pressure to raise funds, spending limits are 
believed to reduce the temptation for parties and candidates 
to offer a quid-pro-quo for large contributions.229 
This rosy description of the effects of campaign finance in Canada 
is a bit challenging to accept wholesale, as the Liberal Party’s recent 
fundraising and “sponsorship” scandal would seem to indicate that 
quid pro quo rewards for large campaign contributions remained a 
problem in Canada even with spending limits and public funding.230  
 
222 Election Expenses Act, 1974 S.C. 739, 747, ch. 51, § 13.2 (Can.). 
223 Canada Elections Act, 2000 S.C. 1, ch. 9 (Can.). 
224 Id. § 422(1) (limiting party spending to the product of $0.62 times the inflation 
adjustment factor and the total number of eligible voters in a given district). 
225 Candidates may only spend a calculated amount based upon the number of eligible 
voters in the district.  Id. §§ 440–441. 
226 Parties may receive federal reimbursement for 22.5 percent of their election expenses 
provided they garner at least two percent of the valid votes nationally, or a total of five 
percent of the valid votes in districts in which they ran candidates.  Id. § 435(1).  Candidates 
may receive an amount that is equal to 15% of their election expenses limit provided for in § 
440, provided that any amount more than 50% of the candidate’s total personal expenses paid 
by him or her and election expenses paid by his or her official agent is returned to the General 
Receiver.  Id. § 464.  Finally, political contributions are eligible for a tax credit worth up to a 
total credit of $500.  Income Tax Act, R.S.C. ch. 1, § 127(3) (1985). 
227 The Canada Elections Act requires radio and television stations to provide free 
primetime air time advertising for registered parties.  Canada Elections Act, 2000 S.C. 133–
134, 140–141, ch. 9, §§ 335, 345 (Can.). 
228 Lisa Young, Regulating Campaign Finance in Canada: Strengths and Weaknesses, 3 
ELECTION L.J. 444, 447 (2004). 
229 Id. at 450. 
230 See id. at 456.  Various officials in the Liberal Party and in the administration of former 
Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien were accused of awarding government advertising, or 
“sponsorship” contracts, to firms that made or were coerced into making campaign donations 
to the Liberal Party.  Id.  This scandal occurred during a regime of spending limits and public 
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Nevertheless, even if the sponsorship scandal resulted in an 
increase in fundraising by the Liberal Party, the data does not show 
any significant effect. 
In fact, as indicated by Figure 8, campaign expenditures by the 
major federal parties appear to be flat, whatever the infusion of 
sponsorship scandal money.231  From this perspective the Canadian 
system appears to have been successful in curbing spending.  Data 
is shown for every year, since parties are always spending money on 
political activities, but the spikes correspond to years in which 
federal general elections were held.  Data has been adjusted for 
inflation using the Consumer Price Index for Canada.232  I do not 
translate this data into campaign spending efficiency terms, as I do 
for the U.S. data, because of the variability of the time between 
federal general elections.  Aggregation of annual data for any 
particular election would render expenditure figures inconsistent, 
since the period of aggregation would vary with the period between 
federal general elections. 
 
funding for candidates.  See id. at 444. 
231 In Canada, a strong party system centers campaign activity upon registered political 
parties, as opposed to individual candidates.  Id. at 445.  Expenses are thus incurred 
predominantly by parties rather than individual candidates.  See, e.g., William T. Stanbury, 
Financing Federal Politics in Canada in an Era of Reform, in CAMPAIGN AND PARTY FINANCE 
IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE 68, 92 (Arthur B. Gunlicks ed., 1993) (illustrating 
much greater “election expenses” than “personal expenses”). 
232 See generally Statistics Canada, Table 326-0002, Consumer Price Index, 
http://cansim2.statcan.ca (last visited Sept. 30, 2005) (providing an online tool to calculate 
Consumer Price Index based on year and product(s)). 
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FIGURE 8 
Total Campaign Expenditures in Canada, All Parties 
(Millions $)233 
 
 Canada’s parliamentary system of government poses different 
challenges than does the American system.  For one thing, federal 
election periods in Canada are typically thirty-six days, following 
the issuance of a writ dissolving Parliament and calling for a 
general election.234  This time of intense campaigning limits the 
period of controversy in a way that lends itself to more solutions 
than the American system, in which perpetual campaigning is the 
norm.  Limiting speech to thirty-six days every three to five years—
the typical period between federal elections—seems less offensive 
than limiting speech in the context of a perpetual American 
campaign.  But the unmistakable lesson from the Canadian 
experience with spending limits is that the Elections Act has clearly 
achieved its goal of arresting the rise of campaign spending.  No 
 
233 See William T. Stanbury, Financing Federal Politics in Canada in an Era of Reform, in 
CAMPAIGN AND PARTY FINANCE IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE 68, 74–75 (Arthur 
B. Gunlicks ed., 1993); Elections Canada On-line, Contributions to Political Parties, 
http://www.elections.ca/ecFiscals/fiscalmain.asp?objectType=start&ul=1 (last visited Jan. 9, 
2006) (providing information on contributions for 1993, 1997, and 2000 under Table 1: 
Summaries of Contributions and Expenses). 
234 Canada Elections Act, 2000 S.C. 29, ch. 9, § 57(1) (Can.).  The statute specifies a 
minimum period of thirty-six days, but convention has limited the election period to 
approximately thirty-six days.  See, e.g., Colin Feasby, Issue Advocacy and Third Parties in 
the United Kingdom and Canada, 48 MCGILL L.J. 11, 45 (2003) (“[A]n election period 
commences when the prime minister requests that the governor-general dissolve Parliament 
and issue an election writ and runs for a maximum of thirty-six days until voting.”). 
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scholarly literature of which I am aware laments the erosion in 
democratic quality in Canada due to the imposition of spending 
limits.  Other countries with some form of spending limitations 
include the United Kingdom235 and France,236 both of which, like 
Canada, have strong freedom of speech traditions. 
Clearly, problems would remain if the U.S. adopted spending 
limitations.  The strongest criticism of campaign spending limits 
seems to be that any financial prohibitions will only result in in-
kind behavior.  Lott argues that limits on contributions will give 
rise to in-kind donations.237  But is this always such a bad thing? 
Would it be such a disaster for democracy to have people donating, 
for example, their time to a political campaign, rather than their 
money?  Perhaps spending limitations would result in candidates 
spending more time meeting with the public than would otherwise 
be the case.  Again, it is not obvious that this would be a bad thing.  
Myriad other possibilities exist, but one wonders if the distortions 
caused by attempts to regulate campaign speech would really be 
worse than the existing distortions. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Hardin has not “exorcised” the spirit of Adam Smith, but he has 
engaged the libertarian clarion call for less government and less 
regulation.  While his insights on the imposition of large-group 
negative externalities are not particularly unique—Pigou 
understood and articulated this decades earlier238—Hardin’s 
observations on how we soil ourselves is distinctive.  It poses a 
direct challenge not only to Smith and libertarian pundits, but also 
to a strong intellectual tradition of individual liberalism in law.  
After Hardin, we could no longer take for granted that the 
individual was the best advocate of her own interests. 
 
235 R.J. Johnston & C.J. Pattie, Great Britain: Twentieth Century Parties Operating Under 
Nineteenth Century Regulations, in CAMPAIGN AND PARTY FINANCE IN NORTH AMERICA AND 
WESTERN EUROPE 123, 130–31 (Arthur B. Gunlicks ed., 1993). 
236 Thomas Drysch, The New French System of Political Finance, in CAMPAIGN AND PARTY 
FINANCE IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE 155, 165–66 (Arthur B. Gunlicks ed., 
1993). 
237 Lott, supra note 157, at 362. 
238 A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 131–33 (1952) (noting that the value of 
marginal private product and the value of marginal social net product can be flows from 
competing employment of a given quantity of resources).  In The Economics of Welfare, 
English economist Alfred Pigou developed the idea that taxes should be imposed to equalize 
the marginal private costs and marginal social costs of an activity which produces negative 
externalities.  Id. at 192, 195. 
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This irony animates a number of public policy problems, in large 
part because our libertarian culture has made us so obsessed with 
defending our liberties that we forget to think about our welfare.  In 
this Article, I argue that the problem of uncontrolled campaign 
spending is one such example.  I do not set forth a Constitutional 
justification for campaign fundraising limits or spending limits.239 
Despite my praise for the BCRA, it does not purport to solve the 
problem of controlling third party expenditures, or even 
acknowledge that a solution exists.  I address only direct federal 
campaign spending.  In the end, if the Constitutional value that we 
are protecting when we strike down these limits is freedom of 
speech, then we must confront threats to that freedom.  This Article 
is meant to demonstrate that one threat to that freedom is the 
excessive exercise of the freedom itself.  Well-recognized intrusions 
upon the right to speak are based upon a recognition of competing 
interests.  My proposed curtailment of speech is motivated by 
protection of the right to speak itself.  While great care must be 
taken to design a regulatory scheme and implement rules that 
minimize perverse incentives, no balancing of interests is necessary. 
It is curious that we have this dichotomy between speech and 
property.  Why does the Constitution treat property regulation and 
speech regulation differently?  Is it because we believe property is 
“scarce” and speech is “free”?  This is clearly not true in a modern, 
information-overloaded society.  I certainly do not advocate 
jurisprudentially collapsing speech and property, but it is worth 
bearing property lessons in mind as we think about campaign 
speech and about speech generally.  Just as the tragedy of the 
commons has taught us that in a property context we sometimes 
cannot trust people alone to order their affairs in a sensible way, we 
should now realize that some paternalism in the speech context may 
be necessary as well.  Because political campaign speech is so 
important to a well-functioning democracy, it is all the more 
important that we consider bringing it into the regulatory realm, 
and not leaving it to chimerical free market ideals. 
 
 
239 But see Blasi, supra note 137, at 1283 (arguing that candidates who devote themselves 
to round-the-clock fundraising implicate the Republican Form of Government Clause of 
Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment). 
